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BALANCING FEDERAL COURT INTERVENTION 
WITH STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
MATHEW D. STAVER* 
Mathew D. Staver writes about the Abstention Doc-
trine. The Article provides an analysis of the Anti-
Injunction Act and the applicability of the Pullman, 
Younger, Rooker-Feldman, Brillhart, and Colorado 
River Abstention Doctrines, paying particular atten-
tion to how each doctrine affects a litigator's practice. 
Most litigators have a vague memory of the Abstention 
Doctrine from their law school civil procedure course. Seem-
ingly unimportant, judged by the amount of time devoted to 
the doctrine in law school, the practitioner may be surprised 
the first time an astute adversary raises the Abstention 
Doctrine in a motion to dismiss. Hoping to quickly respond 
to the motion and move on to the merits of the case, the ad-
vocate may be dismayed to learn that there is an entire body 
of law on the subject. The Abstention Doctrine is a piece-
meal theory. Part of the doctrine has been codified. However, 
most of the Abstention Doctrine is spread throughout a 
patchwork of case law where it has been decompartmental-
ized and subsequently identified by case names.1 
* President and General Counsel of Liberty Counsel, a civil liberties 
education and legal defense organization; BA, 1980, Southern College; M.A., 
1982, Andrews University; J.D., 1987, University of Kentucky. Mr. Staver was 
lead counsel in Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and 
remanded, 41 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane) and Hoover v. Wagner, 47 
F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1995), which gave rise to this article. He wishes to thank 
Rick H. Nelson, Nicole Arfaras Kerr, and Lara M. Johnson. 
1. For a brief comparison of abstention doctrines, see CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241 (1988). For an argu-
ment toward reorienting the abstention doctrines, see James C. Rehnquist, Tak-
ing Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 1049 (1994). For an analysis of Burford abstention applied to RICO, see 
Tracy Doherty et al., Niath Survey of White Collar Crime: Racketeer Influenced 
1143 
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At the heart of the Abstention Doctrine is the balance 
between state and federal sovereignty. This balance is some-
times referred to as federalism or comity. The Abstention 
Doctrine essentially requires federal courts to step aside in 
order to allow the state adjudicatory process to run its 
course. The federal plaintiff must be familiar with absten-
tion issues or run the risk of protracted litigation in federal 
court which may eventually be halted when abstention is 
raised. This Article will review various aspects of the Ab-
stention Doctrine including the Anti-Injunction Act, the Pull-
man, Younger, Rooker-Feldman, Brillhart, and Colorado 
River Abstention Doctrines. After discussing the various 
Abstention Doctrines, this article will then apply these doc-
trines to the case of Cheffer v. McGregor. 2 The plaintiff in 
Cheffer filed a complaint in federal court seeking an injunc-
tion prohibiting enforcement of a state court injunction. This 
classic federal-state conflict lies at the heart of the Absten-
tion Doctrine. 
I. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT 
The Anti-Injunction Act was first codified in 1793.3 The 
Act provides that "[a] court of the United States may not 
grant an injunction to state proceedings in the state court 
except as expressly authorized by an act of Congress or 
where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or 
effectuate its judgments."4 
and Corrupt Organizations, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 769 (1994). Finally, for an 
examination of the conflict between Colorado River Abstention and legislative 
enactments, see David J. McCarty, Preclusion Concerns as an Additional Factor 
When Staying a Federal Suit in Deference to a Concurrent State Proceeding, 53 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1183 (1985). 
2. 6 F.3d at 705. 
3. See Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22 § 5, 1 Stat. 335, as amended, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (1997). The Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 provided in part that a "writ of 
injunction [shall not] be granted [by any federal court] to stay proceedings in 
any court of a state," thus establishing a general prohibition against federal 
intervention. [d. 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997). Passed by Congress in 1793, the precise origins 
of the Act are shrouded in obscurity, but the basic purpose was to prevent 
"needless friction between state and federal courts." Mitchum v. Foster, 407 
U.S. 225, 233 (1972) (quoting Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. 
Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940». The law remained unchanged until amended in 1874 
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In Mitchum v. Foster,5 the United States Supreme 
Court held that actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are 
specifically excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act; therefore, 
the statute does not ban federal courts from enjoining en-
forcement of a state court order.6 
to permit federal courts to stay state court procedings that interfered with the 
administration of federal bankruptcy procedings. The present wording was 
adopted in 1948. The Supreme Court then recognized additional exceptions to 
the Act under at least six other federal laws: (1) legislation providing for 
removal of litigation from state to federal courts under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-50; 
(2) legislation limiting the liability of shipowners under 46 U.S.C. § 185; (3) 
legislation providing for federal interpleader actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2361; (4) 
legislation conferring federal jurisdiction over farm mortgages under 11 U.S.C. 
§ 203; (5) legislation governing federal habeas corpus proceedings under 28 
U.S.C. § 2251; and (6) legislation providing for control of prices under the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205(a), 56 Stat. Section 205(a) expired 
in 1947. See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 234-35. In addition to the above exceptions, 
Congress recognized other exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. One such ex-
ception is the "in rem" exception where a federal court is permitted to enjoin a 
state court proceeding in order to protect its jurisdiction of a res over which it 
first obtained jurisdiction. A second is the "relitigation" exception permitting a 
federal court to enjoin relitigation in a state court of issues already decided in 
federal court. A third exception permits a federal injunction against a state 
court proceeding when the plaintiff in the federal court is the United States 
itself, or a federal agencY asserting "superior federal interests." [d. at 235-36. 
5. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). In Mitchum, a state court proceeding was brought 
to close the defendant's bookstore under a state public nuisance law. The state 
court entered a preliminary injunction closing the bookstore. The defendant 
then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida, alleging a violation of his First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. The federal plaintiff requested injunctive and declaratory 
relief against the state court proceedings on the ground that the state law was 
unconstitutional. The district court refused to enjoin the state court proceeding 
because it found that federal injunctive relief was barred by the Anti-Injunction 
Act. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that suits brought 
under § 1983 are not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. See id. at 243. 
6. See id. In reversing the district court by finding that actions brought 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were excepted from the Anti-Injunction Act, the Su-
preme Court stated: 
[I]f 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not within the 'expressly authorized' exception 
of the anti-injunction statute, then a federal equity court is wholly 
without power to grant any relief in a § 1983 suit seeking to stay a 
state court proceeding. In short, if a § 1983 action is not an 'expressly 
authorized' statutory exception, the anti-injunction law absolutely pro-
hibits in such an action all federal equitable intervention in a pending 
state court proceeding, whether civil or criminal, and regardless of 
how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be. 
Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 229. The Court found that without a § 1983 exception, 
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The Mitchum Court noted that Congress envisioned 
§ 1983 would alter the relationship between the state 
and federal governments. 
[The] legislative history makes evident that Con-
gress clearly conceived that it was altering the rela-
tionship between the States and the Nation with 
respect to the protection of federally created rights; it 
was concerned that state instrumentalities could not 
protect those rights; it realized that state officers 
might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of 
those rights; and it believed that these failings ex-
tended to the state courts. 
Section 1983 was thus a product of a vast trans-
formation from the concepts of federalism that had 
prevailed in the late 18th century when the anti-
injunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of 
§ 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between 
the States and the people, as guardians of the 
people's federal rights - to protect the people from 
unconstitutional action under color of state law, 
'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judi-
cial.' In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly 
authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in 
§ 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a 'suit in 
equity' as one of the means of redress. And this Court 
long ago recognized that federal injunctive relief 
against a state court proceeding can in some circum-
stances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and 
irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights. 
For these reasons we conclude that under the criteria 
established in our previous decisions construing the 
anti-injunction statute, § 1983 is an Act of Congress 
that falls within the 'expressly authorized' exception 
of that law.7 
the federal judiciary would be impermissibly limited. 
7. Id. at 242-43 (citations omitted). 
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The Mitchum decision addressed only the applicability 
of the Anti-Injunction Act, not the Younger Abstention Doc-
trine.8 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar a federal court in-
junction against enforcement of a state court order.9 In 
Machesky, the federal court was faced with a state court 
injunction that prohibited civil rights protestors from demon-
strating within three hundred feet of certain businesses. 10 
In the suit against the state court judge, the federal court 
enjoined enforcement of the state court order. Finding that 
the Anti-Injunction Act did not apply, the court noted: 
"Where the interests in comity collide with the paramount 
8. In discussing the Younger decision, Mitchum pointed out that during the 
previous term the Court had "eschewed any reliance on the [Anti-Injunction] 
statute in reversing the judgment, basing [the Younger] decision instead up-
on ... 'Our Federalism'." Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 230. Later in Mitchum, the 
Court again insisted that its decision was in no way meant to "qualify . . . the 
principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court 
when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." [d. at 243. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, stressed in his concurring opinion 
that the Mitchum decision "does nothing to 'question or qualify in any way the 
principles of equity, comity, and federalism.m [d. at 225 (Burger, J. concurring). 
Burger suggested that on remand the lower court, "before reaching a decision 
on the merits of [the] appellant's claim, should properly consider whether gen-
eral notions of equity or principles of federalism, similar to those invoked in 
Younger, prevent the issuance of an injunction against the state . . . " [d. at 
244. Professor Stravitz argues that the Court specifically created the Younger 
Abstention Doctrine in anticipation of the Court's holding in Mitchum, because 
without Younger, a complete exception to the Anti-Injunction Act would result 
in unrestrained federal court intervention in state court proceedings. See 
Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. 
v. Texaco, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 997, 1027-28 (1989). However, the Mitchum 
Court cited Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. 
Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); 
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942); 
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 312 U.S. 157 (1943); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 
U.S. 117 (1951); and Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), to support the 
proposition that the Younger Abstention Doctrine's foundation was laid many 
years prior to 1971. 
9. See Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). 
10. See id. at 290. 
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institutional interests protected by the First Amendment, 
comity must yield.,,11 The court granted federal injunctive 
relief against enforcement of the state court order. 
In Munoz v. County of Imperial,12 a California state 
court enjoined the selling of water for use outside the coun-
ty. Munoz was not a party to the underlying state court 
action. In granting the request for federal injunctive relief 
under § 1983 enjoining enforcement of the state court order, 
the federal court acknowledged that Munoz was not a party 
to the state court action and could do nothing to appeal or 
otherwise influence the result of the state court proceed-
ing.13 "There [were] no means by which [Munoz could] chal-
lenge the [state court injunction];" so therefore, federal in-
junctive relief was not precluded by the Anti-Injunction 
Act. 14 
II. THE PULLMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
Although the Abstention Doctrine has its roots in Eng-
lish and early American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
first acknowledged the doctrine in the 194115 decision of 
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman CO.16 
A. The Background of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine 
In Chisholm v. Georgia,17 the Supreme Court ruled 
that states may be sued by its citizens. The Court's opinion 
sparked an immediate backlash. Some argued that the 
states might face bankruptcy if they could be sued for dam-
ages. In response to this "startling and unexpected"18 deci-
11. [d. 
12. 510 F. Supp. 879 (S.D. Cal. 1981). 
13. In reviewing whether to grant injunctive relief based on a violation of 
§ 1983, the court must determine that the act sought to be enjoined involves 
state action. A state court injunction constitutes state action. See, e.g., New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948); Gresham Park Community v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981); 
Henry v. First Nat'} Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979). 
14. Munoz, 510 F. Supp. at 885. 
15. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). 
16. 312 U.S. 496 (1941) 
17. 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
18. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 111 (1890). Justice Bradley used this lan-
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sion announced in Chisholm, Congress proposed the Elev-
enth Amendment to the United States Constitution as fol-
lows: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced 
or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of 
another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
state."19 
The Supreme Court interpreted' the Eleventh Amend-
ment to forbid all individual suits brought in federal court 
against any state regardless of citizenship.20 For approxi-
mately a century a wronged plaintiff could not initiate a 
federal suit against a state. 
However, the 1908 Ex parte Younlfl decision dramati-
cally changed the judicial landscape by allowing federalliti-
gants to sue states for alleged constitutional violations. The 
Supreme Court pierced the previously impervious shield of 
state sovereign immunity by creating an exception to the 
Eleventh Amendment.22 The Court held that while a state 
could not be sued by one of its citizens, an officer of the state 
acting in an unconstitutional manner could be sued by one 
of its citizens.23 Consequently, the result of the Court's 
guage to describe both the political and intellectual response to the Chisholm 
decision should the Constitution be interpreted to forbid suits against states by 
citizens of other states but not citizens of the same state. 
19. For a modem historical examination of the Eleventh Amendment, see 
William A Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the 11th Amendment: A Nar-
row Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 
1033, 1058-62 (1983). 
20. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1. 
21. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In Ex parte Young, shareholders of a railroad com-
pany challenged, in federal court, Minnesota legislation that fixed railroad 
rates, alleging the legislation was confiscatory in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The court issued a preliminary injunction which, among other 
things, prohibited the Attorney General of Minnesota, Edward Young, from 
enforcing the legislation. Young attempted to force compliance with the new 
rate, and the court held him in contempt. 
22. The Court's creation of the exception presents an amusing example of a 
judicially-created legal fiction. For a discussion of incorrectly applied Federalist 
principles and a neo-modern look at the Eleventh Amendment, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1481-84 (1987). 
23. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60. Specifically, the Court said: 
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be 
so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act 
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opinion was that, even without their consent, states could be 
sued merely by naming the official who engaged in unconsti-
tutional behavior. 
Congress sought to ameliorate the effects of Ex parte 
Young by restricting preliminary injunctions and by requir-
ing that petitions for particular types of preliminary injunc-
tive relief against state officials be heard by a three-judge 
panel of the district court. The decisions of the three-judge 
panel were directly appealable to the United States Supreme 
Court. 24 
B. Pullman Abstention: The Case 
In 1941, the Supreme Court limited Ex parte Young 
when it handed down Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pull-
man CO.25 The facts of Pullman involved a Texas Railroad 
Co~mission order regarding who could be in charge of train 
cars for sleeping passengers. In Texas, the majority of trains 
pulled more than one sleeping car under the charge of cauca-
sian conductors.26 However, in some areas of Texas where 
train traffic was less busy, trains only included one car for 
sleeping passengers. These single sleeping cars were gener-
ally under the charge of black porters.27 
The Texas Railroad Commission ordered all sleeping 
cars be placed under the charge of conductors, not porters, 
and the Pullman Company, along with other railroad compa-
nies, brought suit in federal COurt.28 The Texas Railroad 
to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, 
and one which does not affect, the state in its sovereign or govern· 
mental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state 
official in attempting, by the use of the name of the state, to enforce 
a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. 
Id. at 159. 
24. On August 12, 1976, the three-judge panel requirement was abolished. 
See Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982». 
25. 312 U.S. at 496 (1941). For a thorough analysis of the Pullman Absten-
tion Doctrine, see Martha A. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The 
Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974). 
26. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 497. 
27. See id. The Court notes that "[als is well known, porters on Pullmans 
are colored and conductors are white." Id. 
28. See id. at 497-98. The order read in pertinent part '"no sleeping car shall 
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Commission's order was assailed as a violation of Texas law 
and the United States Constitution, specifically, the Equal 
Protection, Due Process, and Commerce Clauses.29 A three-
judge panel prohibited enforcement of the order.30 The fed-
eral court found that the Texas Railroad Commission lacked 
authority to promulgate the order.31 The Supreme Court 
reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the three-
judge panel should have abstained from reaching the merits 
of the case.32 
1. Analyzing the Pullman Holding 
In Pullman, the Supreme Court reiterated the general 
rule that federal courts ought to avoid reaching a constitu-
tional question if the case can properly be resolved by ad-
dressing the state issue.33 However, the Court not only 
avoided reaching the constitutional question, it abstained 
from deciding the case based on state law. According to the 
Court, since the Texas law was "far from clear,"34 the Texas 
Supreme Court, and not the federal courts, should first be 
afforded the opportunity to interpret state law.35 The Court 
be operated on any line of railroad in the State of Texas . . . unless such cars 
are continuously in the charge of an employee . . . having the rank and posi-
tion of Pullman conductor'." [d. (ellipsis in original). 
29. See id. at 498. 
30. See id. 
31. The Texas Railroad Commission found power to promulgate the order 
under Tex. Civil Code Ann. § 6445, which granted the authority "to prevent 
any and all . . . abuses" in conducting the business of the railroad. See Pull-
I7Uln, 312 U.S. at 498, n.1. 
32. See Pulll7Uln, 312 U.S. at 501-02. 
33. See id. at 498. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 
347 (1936) (refusing to reach the constitutional question in instances where 
other grounds were present through which the Court could settle the controver-
sy). See also Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) 
(stressing the proper course is to avoid reaching the constitutional question if 
possible unless "important reasons" support a deviation) .. 
34. Pulll7Uln, 312 U.S. at 499. 
35. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter commented: "Reading the 
Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special competence 
in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independent judgment 
regarding the application of that law to the present situation." [d. Had the 
state law been unambiguous, the Supreme Court likely .would have decided the 
case on state law. The Pulll7Uln doctrine is usually invoked when the state law 
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reasoned that federal courts risked interpreting state law 
inaccurately when the law is ambiguous and the state courts 
have not interpreted its meaning.36 An inaccurate interpre-
tation by federal courts could later be contradicted by the 
state courts, thus wasting judicial resources and possibly 
reqUlnng subsequent federal intervention. 37 Therefore, 
when confronted with an ambiguous state la~ which has 
not been interpreted by the state courts, the federal courts 
should "exercise their wise discretion by staying their 
hands,"39 meanwhile retaining jurisdiction to rehear the 
constitutional issue should the need arise.40 
The Pullman Abstention Doctrine does not apply when 
the state law is clear and unambiguous, when every applica-
tion of the state law is unconstitutional, or when the state 
in question is ambiguous and the state courts have not had the opportunity to 
interpret the law. 
36. The Court stated that a federal court's decision on an ambiguous state 
law which has not yet been interpreted by the state courts would be merely "a 
forecast" instead of an accurate determination of the law. Railroad Comm'n of 
Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941). 
37. A "tentative answer" to the state law question could be "displaced tomor-
row by a state" court's decision, resulting in a waste of the "resources of equi-
ty." [d. at 500. 
38. The use of the term "ambiguous" should not be confused with "vague." A 
federal court may invalidate a state law because it is vague or overbroad. How-
ever, if a state law is susceptible to more than one interpretation with one 
interpretation rendering it unconstitutional and another rendering it constitu-
tional, then the federal courts should consider abstaining until the state courts 
have the opportunity to interpret its meaning. However, if it appears the state 
courts either had the opportunity to interpret itsmeaning, or would probably 
refrain from interpreting the law, the federal court should not abstain. 
39. With shades of Justice Black's later soliloquy on "Our Federalism," in 
Younger u. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Justice Frankfurter paid homage to the 
necessity of giving due regard to the independence of the state and federal 
systems whereby state governments should be afford the opportunity to order 
their affairs without federal intervention. See Pullman, 312 U.S. 500-01. That 
the two discourses are similar in rationale is further underscored by Justice 
O'Connor's discussion of "comity and federalism" concerns in weighing whether 
federal courts should abstain based on Pullman. See Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 508 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
40. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501-02. Although Justice Frankfurter did not 
direct the lower court to retain jurisdiction for that specific purpose, the evolu-
tion of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine dictates that federal courts do so. See, 
e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I, 10 
(1983); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
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courts have had the opportunity to interpret the state law 
but have not done so. The principle behind Pullman rests 
upon the rule of statutory construction that a state or feder-
al statute is presumed constitutional. When a state statute 
is ambiguous to the point that one interpretation of its appli-
cation would be unconstitutional, but another interpretation 
would be constitutional, then federal courts should allow 
state courts the first opportunity to interpret the law.41 
Pullman obviously does not apply when a federal statute is 
at issue. 
2. The Expansion of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine 
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in Government & Civic 
Employees Organizing Committee v. S.F. Windsor,42 partial-
ly clarified whether state or federal courts should address a 
constitutional challenge to state law. Windsor involved a 
federal suit to enjoin the enforcement of an Alabama state 
statute which denied employment benefits to public employ-
ees who joined labor unions.48 The United States Supreme 
Court ultimately abstained from reaching the constitutional 
question.44 The Court reasoned that the Alabama Supreme 
41. The Court has been inconsistent when deciding whether Pullman is ap-
propriate or whether the state law is unclear. Compare Eu v. San Francisco 
County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989) (finding Pullman ab-
stention to be inappropriate by the Ninth Circuit because the statute was 
unclear, but the Supreme Court failed to address it in deciding the case) with 
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (ruling that Pullman should be 
applied because the state did have the opportunity to construe the state stat-
ute, despite a lower court's finding that the statute was unconstitutional). For a 
discussion of the inadequacies of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, see Martha 
A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590 (1977) (argu· 
ing that the doctrine is not worth the costs inflicted upon the litigant). 
42. 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam). 
43. See id. The plaintiffs alleged that Alabama Code § 720 (1953) abridged 
their freedom of speech and association in addition to violating the Due Pro· 
cess, Privileges and Immunities, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four· 
teenth Amendment. See id. 
44. The case was batted up and down both the federal and state court sys· 
tems before the Supreme Court's final a<ljudication. First, a three·judge panel 
abstained from reaching the constitutional question. The Supreme Court af· 
firmed the abstention. The plaintiffs then commenced an action in the Alabama 
state courts, eventually reaching the Alabama Supreme Court. See Windsor, 353 
U.S. at 365. Next, the plaintiffs resubmitted the case to the three·judge panel, 
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Court "might have construed the statute in a different man-
ner" if the court had been presented with the constitutional 
claim.45 The fact that the Alabama court did not have the 
opportunity to construe the statute in light of the constitu-
tional claim meant that any decision by a federal court 
would result in an insufficient bona fide interpretation of 
Alabama state law.46 
The Windsor decision caused confusion which remained 
unsettled until 1964 when the Supreme Court handed down 
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners.47 
The England Court settled what procedures should be fol-
lowed if the federal plaintiff desired to preserve the right to 
a choice of forum. 46 The Court held that a federal plaintiff 
remanded to a state court proceeding is not forced to litigate 
the constitutional question in state court.49 The federal 
plaintiff is only required to "inform [the state court] what 
[the] federal claims are, so that· the state statute may be 
but the panel dismissed the case rmding the issue was resolved by the Ala-
bama courts. The plaintiffs again sought review by the United States Supreme 
Court. See ill. The facts of this case provide the greatest fodder for criticism of 
the Pullman Abstention Doctrine. The plaintiffs, exhausted by two fruitless 
trips to the United States Supreme Court, abandoned their claim after they 
were directed to pursue their claim a second time in the Alabama state courts. 
See Martha A Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pull-
man Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1086 n.65 (1974). 
45. Windsor, 353 U.S. at 366. 
46. See id. 
47. 375 U.S. 411 (1960). The Court's decision in Windsor appeared to remove 
from the federal litigant the right to a choice of forum. As noted later, the 
England Court clarified this matter and preserved the litigant's right to choose 
a forum. 
48. England's facts involved a group of chiropractors who filed suit to enjoin 
enforcement of the Louisiana Medical Practice Act as applied to them, alleging 
the Act violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See England, 375 U.S. at 412. A 
three-judge panel abstained per Pullman. A state action then commenced re-
sulting in a ruling against the chiropractors. See ill. at 414. The plaintiffs then 
returned to the three-judge panel for resubmission of their constitutional issues, 
but the district court dismissed the action, finding that the case had been re-
solved by the Louisiana court system. See id. However, the district court 
viewed the case as illustrative of the predicament in which a federal plaintiff 
can become caught in the web of the Windsor decision. See ill. at 414-15. See 
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 194 F. Supp. 521, 522 (E.D. 
La. 1961), rev'd and remanded, England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'r, 
375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
49. England, 375 U.S. at 419. 
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construed 'in light of those claims. "50 Compliance with Eng-
land can be accomplished by the federal plaintiff clearly 
stating for the record that, although the constitutional 
claims are exposed in the state court proceedings, they are 
exposed solely for the purpose of resolving the statute in 
light of the constitutional issues, not to litigate the constitu-
tional issues in state court since the plaintiff intends to 
return to federal court to relitigate the constitutional 
claims.51 The federal litigant's right to a choice of forum 
was therefore preserved by the Court's decision in Eng-
land.52 
III. THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRTINE 
In addition to the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, the 
federal litigant must also consider the Younger Abstention 
Doctrine which was unveiled by the Court in Younger v. 
Harris.53 The Younger Abstention Doctrine is based upon a 
long tradition of federalism and comity growing out of Eng-
lish and early American jurisprudence. 54 
50. England, 375 U.S. at 420. However, the Court generously exempted the 
England plaintiffs from this requirement because the Court found that their 
confusion regarding the Windsor decision prompted them to submit their consti-
tutional claims to the state court and that their confusion was justifiable. See 
id. at 422. 
51. See id. at 42l. 
52. However, a federal litigant is not prohibited from litigating the consti-
tutional claims in state court. The Court took strides to stress that if the liti-
gant "freely and without reservation" submits the constitutional issues to the 
state court for the state court's decision, the litigant may do so. The litigant 
will be bound by the state court decision and cannot avoid a contrary decision 
by re-litigating the issues in federal court. See England, 375 U.S. at 419. 
53. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 
54. See, e.g., Anthony J. Dennis, The Illegitimate Foundations of the Younger 
Abstention Doctrine, 10 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 311 (1990); George D. Brown, 
When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide - Rethinking Younger Ab· 
stention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 114 (1990); James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comi· 
ty Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049 
(1994); David Logan, Judicial Federalism in the Court of History, 66 OR. L. 
REv. 453 (1988); Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Lim-
its of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, (1984); David L. Shapiro, Juris-
diction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985); Donald H. Zeigler, An 
Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to 
Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. 
REv. 266 (1976). 
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A The Background of the Younger Abstention Doctrine 
The seeds of the Abstention Doctrine have their roots in 
English jurisprudence, where courts of equity were prohibit-
ed from interfering with criminal proceedings. As early as 
1888, in the case of In re Sawyer,55 the United States Su-
preme Court refused to intervene in a prospective criminal 
proceeding. 56 The Sawyer Court discussed historical English 
rules for courts of equity and cited the Anti-Injunction Act57 
as a basis for declining to intervene. 58 
In 1908, the Supreme Court decided Ex parte Young,59 
rejecting the argument that federal courts lacked the juris-
diction to enjoin prospective state criminal proceedings. 
Creating a slightly more permissive intervention stan-
dard,60 the Court declared the contested state statute un-
constitutional. 
In 1926, the Court again tightened the abstention stan-
dard vis-a-vis the holding of Fenner v. Boykin.61 In discuss-
ing Ex parte Young, the Fenner Court noted that while fed-
eral courts may enjoin state proceedings, they may do so 
only under "extraordinary circumstances where the danger 
of irreparable loss is both great and immediate. »62 Hence, 
55. 124 U.S. 200 (1888). 
56. See id. at 209-10, 219-20. 
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 
58. See id. at 220. 
59. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
60. The Court held that "officers of the state . . . who threaten and are 
about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce 
against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the . . . Constitution, 
may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action." Id. at 155-56. 
Although the opinion attempted to reconcile the glaring disparity between In re 
Sawyer and Ex parte Young, the Court did so ineffectively, relegating the dis-
cussion of In re Sawyer to two anemic sentences. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 
at 162. The two cases can only be reconciled if Ex parte Young is viewed a8 a 
judicial relaxation of Sawyer's firm principle of non-intervention. 
61. 271 U.S. 240 (1926). 
62. Id. at 243. The Court stated that the criminal defendant must "first set 
up and rely upon his defense in the state courts" before resorting to federal 
court. Id. at 244. Ex parte Young held that assertion of constitutional defenses 
in the state proceeding was not an adequate remedy at law. 209 U.S. at 164-
65. 
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the Fenner Court added a definitive prong upon which later 
analysis would turn in measuring irreparable harm.63 
The Court, in 1943, laid another brick in the foundation 
of the Younger Abstention Doctrine. In Douglas v. City of 
Jeannette,64 the Court declined to intervene in a state court 
proceeding,65 despite the fact that the Court could have de-
cided the case without reaching the Abstention Doctrine.66 
Instead, citing Fenner,67 the Court held that the federal 
plaintiffs had not suffered irreparable injury because they 
could assert their constitutional defense in the state court 
proceeding. The Court found that intervention was unneces-
sary and inappropriate. 
The 1965 decision of Dombrowski v. Pfister66 marked a 
relaxed era in the evolution of Abstention Doctrine. The 
Court addressed the Anti-Injunction Act,69 noting that the 
63. Younger quotes Fenner, noting that the "irreparable injury" must be "both 
great and immediate." Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 
U.S. 240, 243 (1926). Before the Younger Court gave the four·page Fenner opin-
ion a role in jurisprudential history, Fenner languished in ignominy. Until the 
Younger decision, the Court's earlier opinion in Ex parte Young dominated ab-
stention jurisprudence. 
64. 319 U.S. 157 (1943). 
65. The state action in question involved the enforcement of Municipal Ordi-
nance No. 60, which prohibited the distribution of wares, merchandise, or other 
articles without first obtaining a license. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 
157, 159 (1943). The plaintiffs were Jehovah's Witnesses who had previously 
been prosecuted and were then threatened with additional prosecution under 
the ordinance for distributing religious literature. 
66. The Court handed down Murdock v. Pennsylvania on the same day as 
Douglas 319 U.S. 105 (1943). Both cases involved the exact same ordinance and 
some of the same plaintiffs. In Murdock, the Court declared the ordinance 
unconstitutional as applied. See id. at 115. However, although the Court in 
Douglas mentioned the Murdock holding, the Court did not decide the Douglas 
case based on the unconstitutionality of the ordinance. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 
159. Rather, the Court chose to abstain. See id. at 163. In Douglas, the Su-
preme Court upheld a district court's refusal to enjoin application of a city 
ordinance to religious solicitation, even though on the same day the Supreme 
Court in Murdock found the statute unconstitutional as applied to a criminal 
conviction. The Supreme Court reasoned that since injunctive relief looks to the 
future, and it was not alleged that the state courts and prosecutors would fail 
to enforce the Murdock ruling, the Court found nothing to justify an injunction. 
See id. at 165. 
67. 271 U.S. at 240. The Court also cited Davis & Farnum Manufacturing 
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903). 
68. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
69. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2; 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997). Many of 
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Act only bars suits involving cases already pending in the 
state court, but not injunctions against the commencement 
of state court proceedings.70 Dombrowski noted that in cas-
es involving First Amendment allegations of overbreadth, 
abstention is not proper.71 Dombrowski appeared to signal a 
new direction for federal court litigants facing the Absten-
tion Doctrine. 
B. Younger Abstention: The Case 
1. Analyzing the Younger Holding 
The Supreme Court's decision in Younger v. Harris72 
tightened the Dombrowski standard and clarified the Court's 
analysis. The federal plaintiff13 in Younger requested and 
the previous Supreme Court decisions either failed to specifically discuss the 
Anti-Injunction Act or did so only in general terms. Although at the time of 
the In re Sawyer decision the only exception to the Anti-Injunction Act was a 
case "authorized by a bankrupt act," later amendments to the Anti-Injunction 
Act made provision for three exceptions to the general rule against federal 
court intervention: (1) expressly authorized by Act of Congress; (2) necessary in 
aid of a federal court's jurisdiction; or (3) as needed to protect or effectuate a 
federal court's judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1997). 
70. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 484 n.2. 
71. See id. at 486. In Douglas, the Supreme Court found abstention was 
appropriate in part because of an assumption that defense of a criminal prose-
cution would generally assure ample vindication of constitutional rights. 319 
U.S. at 157. However, in the case of an overly broad statute which chills free 
expression, this assumption is not warranted. According to Dombrowski, the 
threat of sanctions may deter free speech, and therefore in the context of First 
Amendment freedoms, the Supreme Court has "not required that all of those 
subject to ove~broad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights. For free 
expression - of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exer-
cising their rights - might be the loser." Id. at 486. 
72. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Court decided five companion cases on the same 
day. In Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971), the Court reversed the lower 
court's decision citing a lack of irreparable injury to plaintiffs. The Court in 
Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971), reversed, based in part on Younger's 
principles, the lower court's suppression order. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 
66 (1971), the Court held the same policies articulated in Younger regarding 
injunctive relief should be utilized in determining whether to issue declaratory 
relief. Both Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971), and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 
U.S. 216 (1971), were per curiam reversals based on abstention rationale. 
73. Although John Harris was the party indicted and the original federal 
plaintiff, Jim Dan, Diane Hirsch, and Farrell Broslawsky intervened in the suit, 
claiming that Harris' prosecution would cause them to "suffer immediate and 
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received injunctive relief14 from a three-judge district court 
panel'5 which enjoined the district attorney76 from prose-
cuting Harris under an unconstitutional statute. 77 
Writing for the majority, Justice Black reversed the 
lower court's decision based on sensitivity with respect to 
equity,7S comity,79 and federalism.so The general rule pro-
irreparable injury." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39 (1971). However, the 
Court held the intervenors lacked a genuine controversy and therefore had no 
standing to join the action. See id. at 42. 
74. The federal plaintiff also requested that the district court "grant 'such 
other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper'" which, in a 
footnote, the Supreme Court stated was an improper request for declaratory 
relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 39 n.2. 
75. Before 1976, constitutional challenges to state laws required the assembly 
of a special panel of three judges. On August 12, 1976, the three-judge panel 
requirement was abolished. See Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. § 1119 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1982». 
76. Evelle J. Younger was the state district attorney from Los Angeles Coun-
ty. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 39. 
77. The statute in question was the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, 
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-11401 (West 1982). In Whitney v. California, 274 
U.S. 357 (1927), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Califor-
nia Criminal Syndicalism Act, but later specifically overruled the Whitney 
Court's decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447·49 (1969) (per cu-
riam), by holding a similar statute, the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act, repug-
nant to the Federal Constitution. 
78. Longstanding equitable principles of English jurisprudence, dating as far 
back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dictate that courts of equity 
should not interfere with criminal proceedings. See Whitten, Federal Declaratory 
and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court 
and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REv. 591, 606 (1975). Equita-
ble intervention requires the court to consider: (1) whether the party in the 
criminal proceeding has an adequate remedy at common law; and (2) whether 
the party will suffer irreparable injury if the court denies equitable relief and 
refuses to interfere with the criminal proceeding. See id. at 600-04. AJJ Justice 
Black's citation to the theory of equitable jurisprudence denotes, these two pil· 
lars of equity jurisprudence are still utilized in American jurisprudence in de-
ciding whether to exercise equitable powers. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. 
79. Comity encompasses the notion that, based on judicial courtesy and defer-
ence, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and effect to the laws and 
judicial holdings of courts from another jurisdiction. See Warren, Federal and 
State Court Interference, 43 lIARv. L. REV. 345, 349 (1930). 
80. The Court entwines the concepts of comity and federalism so tightly that 
it is virtually impossible to discern where one concept begins and the other 
ends. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. Justice Black terms "Our Federalism" as 
the "recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of 
separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National 
Government will fare best if the states and their institutions are left free to 
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vides that federal courts should not interfere with pending, 
ongoing state criminal proceedings except under "special 
circumstances."Bl Special circumstancesB2 include prosecuto-
rial bad faith83 or blatant and flagrant unconstitutional 
construction.84 However, the Court expressed no opinion 
"about the circumstances under which federal courts may act 
when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the 
time the federal proceeding is begun."B5 
The Court held that although Harris had an actual 
controverst6 with the state because he was actually facing 
perform their separate functions in their separate ways." Id. at 44. Justice 
Black's eloquent description of our federalist form of government has ignited 
heated debate among legal scholars regarding the proper amount of deference 
for states' rights shown by the Court via utilization of abstention doctrines. See 
Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the Younger Doctrine and the Duty of 
the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safeguards in the State Criminal 
Process, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 266 (1976); Howard B. Stravitz, Younger Abstention 
Reaches a Civil Maturity: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 997 
(1989); but see Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of 
Federal Deference to State Court Proceedings A Response to Professor Stravitz, 
58 FORDHAM L. REv. 173 (1989). Cf. Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate 
Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1485 (1987) (argu-
ing that only states which fail to follow the federal design of the law should 
face federal court intervention). 
81. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. The Court later states that the "normal thing to 
do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts 
is not to issue such injunctions." Id. at 45. This appears to contradict the 
Court's practice prior to the Younger decision when the Warren Court permitted 
intervention in state court criminal prosecutions. See Martin H. Redish, The 
Warren Court, the Burger Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doc-
trine, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1983) (comparing the two Chief Justices' lega-
cies for willingness to intervene and stray into activist territory). 
82. In a footnote, the Younger Court discussed its holding in Samuels v. 
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), noting that declaratory relief is also improper 
when a prosecution involving a challenge to a state statute is pending in state 
court at the time the federal suit is initiated. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 n.2. 
83. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-50, 56. Prosecutorial exception is akin to a 
glass house, devoid of protection. See C. Keith Wingate, The Bad Faith Harass· 
ment Exception to the Younger Doctrine: Exploring the Empty Universe, 5 REv. 
LmGATION 123 (1986). 
84. See Younger, 401 U.S. 37 at 56 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 
402 (1941». 
85. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. The lack of ongoing state proceedings involving 
the federal plaintiff is a major exception to the Younger Abstention Doctrine. 
86. The Court first defined "case or controversy" in Muskrat v. United States, 
219 U.S. 346, 253-54 (1911) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) 
and In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 FED. 241 (1887», in discussing the re-
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prosecution, the other three plaintiff-intervenors did not 
have an actual controversy and lacked standing.87 Interve-
nors Dan, Hirsch, and Broslawsky merely alleged they felt 
inhibited from exercising their constitutional rights.88 The 
Court found their vague, speculative inhibitions insufficient 
to grant standing.89 The Court hypothesized that an actual 
controversy might exist for the three plaintiff-intervenors 
had they alleged a threat of prosecution, the likelihood of 
prosecution, or a remote possibility of prosecution,90 but 
mere speculatidn of prosecution is insufficient to provide a 
basis for suit.91 Thus, only Harris had standing to bring 
suit.92 
The Court's core holding is that, absent special circum-
stances, a criminal defendant may not enjoin a pending, 
ongoing, state prosecution by filing an action in federal 
quirement that the exercise of judicial power is limited by the Constitution to 
"cases" and "controversies." 
87. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 41·42. 
88. See id. at 42. Intervenors Dan and Hirsch alleged they felt inhibited to 
advocate the replacement of capitalism with socialism while Intervenor 
Broslawsky felt uncertain whether he could, as part of his class studies, teach 
Karl Marx's doctrines or read from the Communist Manifesto. See id. at 39-40. 
89. Emanating from the case or controversy requirement is the requirement 
that the federal plaintiff must have "standing" to bring the lawsuit. The federal 
. plaintiff must show both a palpable injury and a traceable connection between 
the injury and the conduct of the offender. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). See also Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-64 (1992); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125 
(1991); International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane 
Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77-78 (1991). 
90. If the three plaintiff-intervenors alleged a threat of prosecution, the Court 
probably would not have abstained from deciding their claims. Federal injunc-
tive relief would be proper for these three plaintiff-intervenors because they, 
unlike Harris, were not parties to any ongoing state criminal proceedings. 
91. Here Younger cited Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), where the 
Court found the plaintiff's controversy to be purely conjectural in nature and 
without a basis in reality. The dispute was previously argued in Zwickler v. 
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), where the Court ruled that the lower court erred 
in abstaining from deciding the federal plaintiff's constitutional claim regarding 
the distribution of anonymous campaign literature. See id. at 254. In Golden, 
the federal plaintiff, was a former candidate for the House of Representatives 
who had since been appointed to the New York State Supreme Court and, 
according to the Court, would not, in all likelihood, ever again be a candidate 
for the House of Representatives and would probably never again face the 
threat to his constitutional rights. See Golden, 394 U.S. at 109. 
92. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1971). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1162 1997
1162 Oklahoma City University Law Review [Vol. 22 
court. The key to the Court's decision was the fact that the 
federal plaintiff, Harris, was then a subject of a pending 
state prosecution.93 Harris was indicted in a California 
state court prior to filing his federal complaint.94 Because 
Harris would have the opportunity to raise his constitutional 
defenses in the state court proceeding,95 the Court held he 
was not in danger of suffering irreparable injury.96 To en-
join the pending State prosecution would be to crack the 
doctrinal foundation described by the Court as "Our Federal-
ism. »97 Abstention was necessary to preserve the separate 
functions of the state and federal governments. 
The Younger Court specifically refused to express any 
"view about the circumstances under which federal courts 
may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts 
at the time the federal proceeding is begun. »98 In a separate 
concurring opinion,99 Justice Stewart emphasized that Youn-
ger dealt "only with the proper policy to be followed by a 
federal court when asked to intervene. .. in a criminal 
prosecution which is contemporaneously pending in a state 
COurt."lOO Justice Stewart further noted that the Younger 
decision did not "resolve the problems involved when a fed-
93. See icl. at 39-40. 
94. See id. 
95. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49-50. The Court distinguished Harris' oppor-
tunity to raise his constitutional claims in the state proceeding from the federal 
plaintiff in Dombrowski, where the federal plaintiff was not assured that rais-
ing the constitutional claims in the state proceedings would result in the vindi-
cation of the violated constitutional rights because the threatened prosecution 
was employed to harass the defendants. 380 U.S. at 479. 
96. The Court stated that even irreparable injury is "insufficient unless it is 
'both great and immediate.m Younger, 401 U.S. at 46 (quoting Fenner v. 
Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 243-44 (1926). In his concurring opinion which Justice 
Harlan joined, Justice Stewart defined a threat that is great and immediate to 
include "official lawlessness" of the sort that amounts to bad faith prosecution 
or official harassment. Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 56 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
97. For an analysis of whether the federalist defense of judicial review can 
be sustained under modern scrutiny, see Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpre-
tation and Judicial Selection: A View from the Federalist Papers, 61 CAL. L. 
REV. 1669 (1988). 
98. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 (emphasis added). 
99. The concurring opinion also applies to Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 
(1971); Fernandez v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 
(1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). 
100. Younger, 401 U.S. at 55 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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eral court is asked to give injunctive ... relief from future 
state criminal prosecutions,,,lOl because Younger clearly 
confined "itself to deciding the policy considerations that ... 
must prevail when federal courts are asked to interfere with 
pending state prosecutions. ,,102 
The import of the pending state proceeding was further 
emphasized by the Court's later decision in Steffel v. 
Thompson. 103 In Steffel, the Supreme Court answered the 
question specifically reserved in Samuels: 104 "whether 
declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has 
been threatened, but is not pending, and a showing of bad 
faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not 
been made.,,105 The Supreme Court was advised at oral ar-
gument that a state court proceeding was concurrently ad-
dressing the same issues presented in the federal court. 106 
Nevertheless, the Court refused to abstain. 
The litigant in Steffel w~s not involved in any pending 
state court proceedings but had been threatened with arrest 
under a state criminal statute.107 Steffel filed suit in the 
district court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief re-
straining the respondents from enforcing a state statute in 
violation of his protected constitutional rights, but the dis-
trict court denied all requested relief finding the suit lacking 
in "'the rudiments of an active controversy between the par-
ties. ",108 Plaintiff Steffel appealed the denial of declaratory 
relief to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.109 
101. [d. at 55 (emphasis in the original). 
102. [d. at 56. 
103. 415 U.S. 452 (1974). 
104. 401 U.S. at 66; see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974). 
105. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 454. In Steffel, Guy Steffel and a companion were 
handbilling against American involvement in Vietnam at the North Dekalb 
Shopping Center. Police officers told them to stop handbilling or face arrest. 
While Mr. Steffel ceased handbilling when he left the shopping center, his 
companion stayed on the premises, continued handbilling, and was arrested. See 
id. at 455-56. 
106. Steffel's companion pursued a claim for relief in the state court system, 
while Steffel, who was not arrested, pursued a claim for relief through the 
federal court system. See id. at 456. 
107. The threatened charge was criminal trespass in violation of Ga. Code 
Ann. § 26-1503 (1972). See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 456. 
108. [d. 
109. Steffel abandoned his appeal from denial of injunctive relief in his appel-
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The Fifth Circuit recognized that Younger and Samuels 
were expressly limited to circumstances where state prosecu-
tions were pending when the federal action was initiated, 
but the court refused to grant relief based on the opinion 
that the irreparable injury standard also applied to requests 
"'for injunctive relief against threatened state court criminal 
prosecution' as well as against a pending prosecution. ,,110 
Steffel then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
Writing for the Court, and reaffirming the need for sensitivi-
ty toward the notions enumerated in Younger, Justice 
Brennan observed that "[n]either Younger nor Samuels, 
however, decided the question whether federal intervention 
might be permissible in the absence of a pending state pros-
ecution."lll The Steffel decision answered this question by 
holding: 
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the 
time the federal complaint is filed, federal interven-
tion does not result in duplicative legal proceedings 
or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor 
can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be 
interpreted as reflecting negatively upon the state 
court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.112 
late brief. He appealed only the denial of declaratory relief. See Steffel, 415 
U.S. at 456 n.6. 
110. [d. at 457. 
111. [d. at 461. 
112. [d. at 462. "Appellants in these two cases were all indicted in a New 
York State Court on charges of criminal anarchy." Samuels, 401 U.S. at 67. 
Steffel pointed out that in the absence of a pending state action, the Abstention 
Doctrine is not applicable: 
While a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a 
concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on 
the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is 
pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of inten-
tionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he 
believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid be-
coming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding. 
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. In Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38 
(D. Conn. 1987), the court refused to abstain in a case involving a federal 
plaintiff who was not a party to the underlying state action and who filed a 
federal challenge to the enforcement of a state court order. Since there was no 
pending prosecution against the federal plaintiff, and thus no adequate remedy 
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The Court observed that in Roe v. Wade,ll3 while the 
prosecution of Dr. Halliford for violating a Texas abortion 
law was pending, the federal court was not prevented from 
granting Plaintiff Roe, against whom no action was pending, 
a declaratory judgment that the statute was unconstitution-
al.114 Justice Brennan stated: "[T]he relevant principles of 
equity, comity, and federalism 'have little force in the ab-
sence of a pending state proceeding.'"115 The focus is on 
pending state action against the federal plaintiff rather than 
pending state action against some other third party. Al-
though similar questions may be litigated in the state claim, 
"Abstention would be improper in a case merely because the 
same federal law questions presented are also being litigated 
in another case. "116 
In Wooley v. Maynard,l17 the federal plaintiff was ar-
rested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating the 
state law which required the display of a particular license 
plate on all automobiles registered within the state. After 
serving his sentence, the state court defendant filed a claim 
in federal court seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state 
statute on the basis that the statute was in violation of the 
First Amendment. In addressing the principles of equitable 
restraint enunciated in Younger, the Supreme Court noted 
that the federal plaintiff was not attempting to annul the 
results of a state trial, but rather was trying to obtain pro-
spective relief to preclude future prosecution under the stat-
ute. Under those circumstances, the federal plaintiff could 
not "be denied consideration of a federal remedy."118 
The two pillars of Younger include (1) a pending state 
proceeding (2) against the same party bringing the federal 
action. The Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply 
available to the federal plaintiff, the court refused to abstain. 
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
114. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471 n.19. 
115. [d. at 462 (quoting Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509 
(1972» (emphasis added). 
116. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E. D. lll. 1978). 
117. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
118. [d. at 71. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1166 1997
1166 Oklahoma City University Law Review [Vol. 22 
when there is no pending state proceeding against the feder-
al plaintiff at the time the federal complaint is filed. 
2. The Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine 
The Supreme Court's decision in Younger dealt only 
with federal court intervention in pending, ongoing state 
criminal prosecutions. However, since the Court's 1971 
opinion, the Younger Abstention Doctrine has been expanded 
to apply to more than just state criminal proceedings. 
a. Declaratory Relief 
Applying the Younger Abstention Doctrine, the Samuels 
Court declined federal intervention in an ongoing state pro-
ceeding despite the fact that the plaintiff requested both 
injunctive and declaratory relief. 119 In Samuels the Su-
preme Court found very little difference between injunctive 
and declaratory relief since 
[t]he Declaratory Judgment Act provides that after a 
declaratory judgment is issued the district court may 
enforce it by granting "[flurther necessary or proper 
relief," and therefore a declaratory judgment issued 
while state proceedings are pending might serve as 
the basis for a subsequent injunction against those 
proceedings to "protect or effectuate" the declaratory 
judgment, and thus result in a clearly improper inter-
ference with the state proceedings.12o 
The Supreme Court therefore held that 
in cases where the state criminal prosecution was 
begun prior to the federal suit, the same equitable 
principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction 
must be taken into consideration by federal district 
courts in determining whether to issue a declaratory 
judgment, in that wherein an injunction would be 
119. See id. at 72. 
120. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1167 1997
1997] Balancing Federal Court Intervention 1167 
impermissible under these principles, declaratory re-
lief should ordinarily be denied as well. 121 
The Court also made clear its decision did not suggest 
that a declaratory judgment should never be issued in cases 
where injunctive relief would be considered improper. l22 
The Court pointed out that 
there may be unusual circumstances [where even 
though] an injunction might be withheld, . . . a de-
claratory judgment might be appropriate and might 
not be contrary to the basic equitable doctrines gov-
. erning the availability of relief. l23 
The same day in which Younger was decided, the Court 
handed down Samuels v. Mackell,124 that expanded 
Younger's proscription against federal injunctive relief in-
volving a pending state criminal proceeding to also apply to 
declaratory relief. 
b. Quasi-Criminal Proceedings 
Huffman involved an Ohio public nuisance statute 
which provided, inter alia, that a place exhibiting obscene 
films was considered a nuisance.125 Any establishment vio-
lating the statute was subject to closure for up to one year 
and any items considered obscene were subject to a forced 
sale. l26 In Huffman, a state trial court ruled in favor of the 
city in an action brought against a theater owner. Instead of 
appealing the state decision, the theater owner filed suit in 
the federal district court, alleging that the city's use of the 
statute deprived the owner of certain constitutional rights. 
The owner sought both injunctive and declaratory relief.127 
121. [d. at 73. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. 
124. See 401 U.S. at 66. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. 
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The district court found the nuisance statute unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment and enjoined execution of 
the state court's judgment. The Supreme Court noted that 
the federalism principle enunciated in Younger applied with 
equal force to civil proceedings that essentially were quasi-
criminal in nature. l28 The Court found critical similarities 
between a criminal prosecution and the Ohio nuisance pro-
ceedings.l29 The Court found that the Younger Abstention 
Doctrine should apply in part because the theater owner 
could have reached the same Supreme Court by proceeding 
through the state appellant process. Instead, the theater 
sought to use the federal court as a type of an appellate 
court over the state court proceeding.l30 The next expan-
sion occurred in 1975 with Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. ,t31 
where the Court expanded Younger to encompass quasi-
criminal cases.132 
c. Quasi-Judicial Proceedings 
In another case which arose out of the state of Ohio, a 
religious school brought a civil rights action against the Ohio 
Civil Rights Commission, seeking to enjoin the Commission 
from exercising jurisdiction over a sex discrimination com-
plaint brought by a discharged teacher.l33 After a pregnant 
teacher was told that her employment contract would not be 
renewed because of the school's religious doctrine that moth-
ers should stay at home with their pre-school children, she 
contacted an attorney who threatened suit. l34 The school 
128. ld. at 604. 
129. ld. 
130. ld. at 605-06. 
131. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). 
132. The Court based its decision in part on the finding that the civil enforce-
ment was "in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes." Huffman, 420 
U.S. at 604. In his dissent, Justice Brennan, with whom Justices Douglas and 
Marshall joined, vigorously contested the above quoted language as "the first 
step toward extending to state civil proceedings generally the holding" in Youn-
ger, an extension with which he disagreed. ld. at 613-18 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
133. See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 
(1986). 
134. See id. 
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then rescinded its decision not to renew the teacher, but 
terminated her anyway because of her violation of their 
internal dispute resolution doctrine. The teacher then filed a 
complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission. The Com-
mission initiated administrative proceedings against the 
schooL 135 During the pendency of the administrative pro-
ceedings, the religious school filed suit in federal district 
court seeking an injunction against the administrative pro-
cess. The district court refused to enter an injunction, but 
the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. l36 The Supreme Court ruled that the federal courts 
should have abstained from adjudicating the case under the 
Younger Abstention Doctrine.137 The Court therefore held 
that the Younger Abstention Doctrine was applicable to 
quasi-judicial proceedings. l36 Following Huffman, the Court 
inexorably expanded Younger to include not only quasi-crim- . 
inal cases,139 but quasi-judicial cases. l40 
135. See id. 
136. See id. at 619·20. 
137. Id. at 620. Citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576·77 (1933), the 
Court noted that administrative proceedings looking toward the revocation of a 
license to practice medicine may in certain circumstances command a respect 
equal to typical court proceedings. The Court also pointed out that abstention 
may apply to preclude a federal court from enjoining lawyer disciplinary pro-
ceedings initiated by state ethics committees. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 
at 628 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 
U.S. 423 (1982» (administrative proceedings involving Bar disciplinary actions 
are "judicial in nature"). 
138. See Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. at 628. 
139. See also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (applying the principles of 
Younger abstention to appeals of contempt of court in judgment creditor action); 
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (applying Younger to attachment 
proceedings); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979) (applying Younger to a Texas 
child welfare agency involving the loss of custody of a child based on allega-
tions of child abuse). 
140. See, e.g., Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 
U.S. 423 (1982); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Ohio Civil 
Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986). 
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d. Civil Proceedings 
In Penzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 141 a judgment debtor 
filed suit in federal district court challenging a Texas state 
court judgment in excess of eleven billion dollars and further 
challenged the constitutionality of the Texas judgment lien 
and appeal bond provisions which required that a bond be 
posted in excess of thirteen billion dollars. Under Texas law 
a judgment creditor can execute a lien on a judgment 
debtor's property unless the debtor files a Supersedeas Bond 
in at least the amount of the judgment plus interest and 
cost.142 After the jury's verdict, but before the trial court 
entered judgment, it was clear that Texaco would not be 
able to post a bond in the amount of thirteen billion dollars. 
Since Texaco would not be able to post such a high bond, 
Penzoil would have been able to commence enforcement of 
the judgment on the verdict even before Texaco's appeal had 
been resolved. l43 Therefore, Texaco filed suit in federal dis-
trict court claiming that the proceedings violated rights se-
cured by the Constitution and various federal statutes. Texa-
co asked the district court to enjoin Penzoil from taking any 
enforcement action. The district court ruled in favor of Texa-
co and issued a preliminary injunction. l44 Applying the 
Younger Abstention Doctrine, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the court should have abstained under the principles of fed-
eralism.145 More particularly, the Court pointed to the fact 
that the Texas courts never had the opportunity to construe 
the statute and thus federal intervention would have de-
prived the Texas courts of "an opportunity to adjudicate its 
constitutional claims. "146 In making this statement the 
Supreme Court clearly had in mind the principles annunci-
ated in the Pullman Abstention Doctrine. Though the Su-
preme Court did not focus on the fact that this case involved 
141. See id. 
142. See id. at 6. 
143. See id. at 6. 
144. See id. at 8. 
145. See id. at 10. 
146. [d. at 17. 
HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1171 1997
1997] Balancing Federal Court Intervention 1171 
purely a civil matter, it is clear that the Court extended the 
Abstention Doctrine to civil proceedings. The Supreme Court 
eventually expanded the Younger Abstention Doctrine to 
civil proceedings.147 
IV. THE ROOKER-FELDMAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
The so-called Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine origi-
nated in the case of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 148 and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman. 149 The 
concept underlying the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine 
is that Congress has conferred only original jurisdiction, not 
appellate jurisdiction, on the federal district courts. The 
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine exists to prevent a party in a state 
court from having two bites at the apple: one through the 
state courts up through the United States Supreme Court, 
and a subsequent collateral attack through the federal 
courts. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine prohibits a 
party who litigates a case up through the state court system, 
and not content with the ruling handed down by the state 
court, ceases litigation and then begins the same litigation 
in the federal court system. In other words, rather than 
choosing to request the United States Supreme Court by 
writ of certiori to review the case, the party ceases litigation 
and begins litigating the identical issue in the federal dis-
trict court. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine essen-
tially holds that the federal district court does not have 
appellate jurisdiction over the state court. The avenue for 
the state court party is to continue through the state court 
proceeding up to the United States Supreme Court if possi-
ble. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine is inapplicable 
in cases where the federal plaintiff was not a party to the 
state court proceeding. "The Rooker-Feldman Abstention 
Doctrine does not apply to bar a suit in federal court brought 
by a party that was not a party in the preceding action in 
state court."150 In Valenti v. Mitchell/51 the Third Circuit 
147. See, e.g., Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (where neither party was 
the state). 
148. 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
149. 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
150. United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). The Sixth 
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stated it could find "no authority which would extend the 
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine to persons not parties 
to the proceedings before the State Supreme Court .... "152 
The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does not apply 
where the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state liti-
gation. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in Martin v. 
Wilks,153 has clearly established that a federal plaintiff is 
not required to intervene in a state court proceeding in order 
to protect threatened constitutional rights: 
Petitioners argue that, because respondents failed to 
timely intervene in the initial proceedings, their cur-
rent challenge to actions taken under the consent 
decree constitutes an impermissible "collateral at-
tack" .... The position has sufficient appeal to have 
commanded the approval of the great majority of the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, but we agree with the con-
trary view. . . The law does not impose upon any 
person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of 
Circuit in Owens observed the following: 
Neither the Postal Service nor any other federal defendant was a 
party to the action in the Ohio courts . . . Clearly, a party cannot be 
said to be appealing a decision by a state court when it was not a 
party to the case. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply to bar 
a suit in federal court brought by a party that was not a party in a 
preceding action in state court. . . . A party has no obligation to at-
tempt to intervene in a state court action when it is not named in 
the suit in order to preserve its rights. Because the Postal Service 
was not a party in a state court action in this case, the Rooker-
Feldman Doctrine does not apply and the district court properly exer-
cised its jurisdiction. 
Owens, 54 F.3d at 274. 
151. 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992). 
152. [d. at 297-98. In Huffman, 420 U.S. at 598, the federal party was also 
party to a state court action prior to the time the federal suit was initiated. 
The federal plaintiff sought federal court review of a state court ruling. Fol-
lowing the entry of judgment by the state court, the state court defendant filed 
suit in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to enjoin pros-
ecution. "Rather than appealing [the state court] judgment within the Ohio 
court system, [the state court defendants] immediately filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio." Huffman, 420 U.S. at 
598. Here Rooker·Feldman abstention was appropriate because the state court 
parties sought to use the federal courts as an appellate court. 
153. 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
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voluntary intervention in a suit to which he IS a 
stranger. 1M 
Indeed, the Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine does 
not require "that persons claiming a violation of their federal 
rights have an obligation before turning to [a] federal court 
to see whether there is some state court proceeding that 
they might join in order to present their federal claims 
there."I55 "A nonparty is not precluded from relitigating 
matters decided in a prior action simply because it passed by 
an opportunity to intervene."156 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court stated, in Steffel v. Thompson, that a federal plaintiff 
is not required "first to seek vindication of his federal rights 
in a state declaratory judgment action. ,,157 A federal plain-
tiff is "not required to utilize state judicial remedies before, 
or instead of, bringing a Section 1983 action in federal 
court. ,,158 
154. [d. at 762-63 (citations omitted). In Huffman, the Court addressed the 
issue of exhausting state remedies. At the time the state court party filed suit 
in federal district court, "it had available the remedy of appeal to the Ohio 
Appellate Court." 420 U.S. at 610. Huffman clarified its opinion by stating the 
following: 
By requiring [an] exhaustion of state appellate remedies for the pur-
poses of applying Younger[,] we in no way undermine Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961). There we held that one seeking redress under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of federal rights need not first initiate 
state proceedings based on related state causes of action. [d. at 183. 
Monroe v. Pape had nothing to do with the problem presently before 
us, that of the deference to be accorded state proceedings which have 
already been initiated and which afford a competent tribunal for the 
resolution of federal issues. Our exhaustion requirement is likewise not 
inconsistent with such cases as City Bank Farmers' Trust Company v. 
Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934) and Bacon v. Rutland R. Company, 232 
U.S. 134 (1914), which expressed the doctrine that a federal equity 
plaintiff challenging state administrative action need not have ex-
hausted his state judicial remedies. Those cases did not deal with 
situations in which the state judicial process had been initiated. 
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609 n.21 (emphasis added). 
155. Hoover v. Wagner, 47 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1995). 
156. Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3rd Cir. 1992). See also Bickham v. 
Lashof, 620 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1980). 
157. 415 U.S. at 475. 
158. Leaf v. Supreme Court of State of Wisconsin, 979 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 
1992) (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982». In Guarino 
v. Larson, 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit noted the following: 
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v. THE BRILLHART ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
The Brillhart Abstention Doctrine originated in the case 
of Brillhart v. Excess Insurance CO. 159 To properly apply 
Brillhart it is essential to understand that the facts of the 
case dealt with (1) a pending parallel state suit, and (2) the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.1°O Anticipating a coercive suit, 
an insurance company sought declaratory relief in federal 
court of nonliability on an insurance policy. The issues pre-
sented in the federal court involved only state claims which 
were parallel to the state issues in the pending state pro-
ceeding. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
dismissal of the suit, agreeing that although the district 
court had jurisdication to hear the suit, "it was under no 
compulsion to exercise that jurisdiction. "161 The Supreme 
Court also agreed that when federal courts are presented 
with a suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act and there is 
a pending parallel state proceeding, the question is whether 
the controversy "can better be settled in the proceeding 
pending in the state court."162 
Our holding only applies where a litigant has been summoned to 
participate in a state court proceeding or has voluntarily chosen a 
state forum for some of his or her claims. In such cases, a litigant 
must present all of his or her claims arising from the same transac-
tion in order to avoid waiving those claims he or she does not raise. 
We are not asserting that a litigant who has an opportunity to choose 
between a state or federal forum to raise his or her initial claim must 
choose a state forum in order to avoid waiver. 
1d. at 1161 n.7. 
159. 316 U.S. 491 (1942). 
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1997). The Act provides that a court "may de-
clare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration." 1d. 
161. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494. 
162. 1d. at 495. Although Brillhart did not set out an exclusive list of factors 
governing a federal court's exercise of this discretion, it did provide some useful 
guidance. For example, the district court should examine "the scope of the 
pending state court proceeding and the nature of the defenses open there." 1d. 
This inquiry requires the court to consider "whether the claims of all parties in 
interest can satisfactorily be adjudicated in that proceeding, whether necessary 
parties have been joined, whether such parties are amenable to process in that 
proceeding, etc." 1d. "[A]t least where another suit involving the same parties 
and presenting opportunity for ventilation of the same state law issues is pend-
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Some time after Brillhart was decided, the Supreme 
Court handed down Colorado River Water Conservaton Dis-
trict v. United Statesl63 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hos-
pital v. Mercury Construction Corp.l64 Under the Colorado 
River Abstention Doctrine a federal court may abstain only 
under "exceptional circumstances. ,,165 A split of opinion 
arose among the circuit courts wherein some held that a 
federal court may stay a declaratory judgment action in 
favor of a pending parallel state proceeding under only ex-
ceptional circumstances,l66 whereas other circuit courts 
held that the more discretionary Brillhart standard applies 
to declaratory actions when there is a parallel state proceed-
ing.167 The Supreme Court resolved this dispute in Wilton 
v. Seven Falls CO. I68 The Court noted that Brillhart had 
not been overruled by Colorado River or Moses H. Cone in 
that neither case dealt with the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.169 "Since its inception, the Declaratory Judgment Act 
has been understood to confer on federal courts unique and 
sustantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the 
rights of litigants. "170 The Wilton Court noted that the De-
ing in state court, a district court might be indulging in '[glratuitous interfer· 
ence: if it permitted the federal declaratory action to proceed." Wilton, 515 U.S. 
at 283 (quoting Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). 
163. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
164. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
165. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813. 
166. See, e.g., Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Missouri Elec. Works, 23 F.3d 
1372, 1374 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that, pursuant to Colorado River and 
Moses H. Cone, a district court may not stay or dismiss a declaratory judgment 
action absent "exceptional circumstances"); Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co. v. 
Connecticut Bank & Trust, 806 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1986). 
167. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Fed., Inc., 996 F.2d 774, 
778 n.12 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the "exceptional circumstances" test of 
Colorado River and Moses H. Cone is inapplicable in declaratory judgment 
actions); Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1992). 
168. 515 U.S. 277 (1995). 
169. See Wilton, 515 U.S. at 285. 
170. [d. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
543 (1985); E. Borchard, Discretion to Refuse Jurisdiction of Actions for Declara-
tory Judgments, 26 MINN. L. REv. 677 (1942); Edwin Borchard, DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENTS 312-14 (2d ed. 1941). 
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claratory Judgment Act creates "an opportunity, rather than 
a duty," to grant relief to qualifying litigants. 171 
The rule then under the Brillhart Absention Doctrine is 
that when a federal court is faced with a suit involving the 
resolution of state issues brought under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act by parties who are also parties in a pending 
parallel state proceding, the court has substantial discretion 
to stay the proceedings in favor of the pending state suit.172 
In such a case the Colorado River and Moses H. Cone "excep-
tional circumstances" test is inapplicable.173 
VI. THE COLORADO RNER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE 
The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine originated in 
the case of Colorado River Water Conservation District v. 
United States. 174 Considerations underlying the Colorado 
River Abstention Doctrine include conservation of judicial 
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.175 
Under the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine, a federal 
court may abstain from hearing a claim when there is a 
pending state proceeding only under "exceptional circum-
171. 515 U.S. at 288. 
172. See id. at 289-90. 
173. [d. 
174. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The facts in Colorado River involved the manage-
ment and allocation of water. Colorado enacted legislation under which the 
state was divided into seven Water Divisions, each with a procedure designed 
to resolve disputes regarding water claims. Seeking to acljudicate reserved 
rights claimed on behalf of itself and certain Indian tribes, as well as rights 
based on state law in one of the Water Divisions, the United States, which had 
previously asserted non-Indian reserved water rights in three other State Water 
Divisions, brought suit in federal district court. One of the federal defendants 
sought in state court to make the Government a party to proceedings in one of 
the Water Divisions for the purposes of adjudicating all of the Government's 
claims, both state and federal, pursuant to The McCarran Amendment, 43 
U.S.C. § 666 (1997). This law requires consent to join the United States in any 
suit (1) for the adjudication of water rights, or (2) the administration of such 
rights, where it appears that the United States owns or is acquiring such 
rights by appropriation under state law or otherwise. The district court dis-
missed the action based on abstention. The court of appeals reversed. The Su-
preme Court found that abstention was not proper under any existing theory 
but the court nevertheless granted dismissal. 
175. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. 
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stances."176 The Colorado River Court found exceptional 
circumstances under the facts of the case. 
[T]he Court deemed dispositive a clear federal policy 
against piecemeal adjudication of water rights; the 
existence of an elaborate state scheme for resolution 
of such claims; the absence of any proceedings in the 
District Court, other than the filing of the complaint, 
prior to the motion to dismiss; the extensive nature of 
the suit; the 300-mile distance between the District 
Court and the situs of the water district at issue, and 
the prior participation of the Federal Government in 
related state proceedings.177 
The Court noted that as between state and federal 
courts, the rule is that the "pendency of an action in the 
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same 
176. 424 u.s. at 813-14. 
177. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 284. 
The Supreme Court in Madsen found that as applied to the state court 
defendants the iJijunction was a content-neutral restriction. This was based 
upon the fact that the injunction took into consideration past actions and at-
tempted to restrain those activities. However, the same state court iJijunction 
would probably operate as a content-based restriction when applied against 
nonparties who had no past history of illegal behavior. See Machesky v. Bizell, 
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting a federal injunction against a state 
court iJijunction which the federal court found to be unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it lumped protected speech with unprotected speech in such 
a way as to abridge important public interests). "Machesky holds that where an 
injunction is attacked on First Amendment grounds and is facially overbroad, 
abstention for comity and federalism reasons is inappropriate." McKusick, 96 
F.3d at 49 fn. 6. The McKusick court incorrectly assumed that since the 
Madsen injunction was found to be content-neutral as applied to parties, it was 
also content-neutral as applied to nonparties. McKusick, 96 F.3d at 488-489. 
The Supreme Court in Madsen addressed only parties, and specifically indicated 
that the parties were prohibited from challenging the "in concert" section since 
this did not apply to them. Thus Madsen addressed only the application of the 
injunction to the state defendants, Madsen 114 S.C. at 2530, whereas Cheffer 
addressed only the "in concert" provision. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708-711. It is clear 
that a state court injunction taking into consideration past illegal behavior may 
operate as a content-neutral restriction on such activities, but the same injunc-
tion operating like a statute and applied against nonparties without past illegal 
behavior is a content-based restriction. Thus, McKusick misreads the reach of 
the Madsen case. 
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matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction."178 As be-
tween federal district courts, there is no similar rule, but 
"the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.,,179 
In assessing the appropriateness of dismissal, the federal 
court may consider factors such as the inconvenience of the 
federal forum, the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litiga-
tion, and the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the 
concurrent forums. No one factor is necessarily determina-
tive, and only "the clearest of justifications will warrant 
dismissal. ,,180 When considering these various factors, the 
Supreme Court in Colorado River noted the following: 
Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is 
the exception, not the rule. The doctrine of absten-
tion, under which a District Court may decline to 
exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is 
an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of 
a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly 
before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases 
can be justified under this doctrine only in the excep-
tional circumstances where the order to the parties to 
repair to the state court would clearly serve an im-
portant countervailing interest. [I]t was never a doc-
trine of equity that a federal court should exercise 
judicial discretion to dismiss a suit merely because a 
State court could entertain it. lSI 
The key to the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is to 
determine whether there is a parallel state proceeding that 
can provide complete relief.182 The parallel factor and the 
availability of complete relief are, "for all practical purposes, 
identical. "183 "A suit is 'parallel' when substantially the 
same parties are contemporaneously litigating substantially 
178. [d. (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910». 
179. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. 
180. [d. at 818-19. 
181. [d. at 813-14 (citations and quotations omitted). 
182. See Baskin v. Bath Township Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 15 F.3d 569, 571 
(6th Cir. 1994) (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 
460 U.S. 1 (1983». 
183. Heitmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 528 (6th Cir. 1990). 
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the same issues in another forum, thus making it likely that 
judgment in one suit will have a res judicata effect on the 
other suit. ,,184 
Colorado River abstention is inappropriate in this 
case because the defendants fail to satisfy the thresh-
old requirement that there be a concurrent state 
court proceeding ... [W]e feel compelled to accept the 
plaintiffs allegation that the state court proceeding is 
over and done with. Accordingly, we must conclude 
that there is no pending state proceeding and the 
Colorado River abstention does not apply . . . .185 
The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine clearly does not 
apply if substantially the same parties litigating substantial-
ly the same issue in a federal court have ceased their litiga-
tion in the state courtS. I86 If the federal plaintiff is not a 
party to the state court proceeding, then Colorado River 
likewise does not apply. 187 
VII. APPLYING THE PULLMAN, YOUNGER, ROOKER-FEWMAN, 
BRILLHART, AND COLORADO RNER ABSTENTION DOCTRINES 
The Pullman Abstention Doctrine does not apply when 
the state law is clear and unambiguous, the state courts 
have interpreted state law, or even when the state courts 
have had the opportunity to interpret the state law but have 
failed or refused to do so. Notwithstanding the United States 
Supreme Court's expansion of Younger, the Younger Absten-
184. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1229 
n.1 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Burnstein v. Hosiery Mfg. Corp. of Morgantown, 
Inc., 850 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. N.Y. 1994); Strasen v. Strasen, 897 F. Supp. 1179, 
ll86 (E.D. Wis. 1995). 
185. Strasen, 897 F. Supp. at ll86 (citations omitted). 
186. See Leaf, 979 F.2d at 589. Abstention is improper where there is no 
pending proceeding in a state court. See Aekenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 
(1992). 
187. In the context of abstention generally, see United States v. Owens, 54 
F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995); Hoover, 47 F.3d at 849; Bickham v. Lashof, 620 
F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1980). See also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 756 (1989); 
Steffel, 415 U.S. at 472 ("requiring the federal courts totally to step aside when 
no state [litigation] is pending against the federal plaintiff would turn federal-
ism on its head"). 
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tion Doctrine does not apply when there is no pending state 
proceeding against the federal plaintiff at the time the feder-
al complaint is filed. The Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doc-
trine does not apply if the federal plaintiff is not using the 
federal court system as a type of appellate panel to review 
the state court ruling. Rooker-Feldman is only concerned 
with a federal plaintiff who begins in the state court system 
and fails to exhaust the state court appellate process. For 
example, Rooker-Feldman would apply to prohibit federal 
court intervention in a case where a state court plaintiff 
proceeds with litigation through the state court system, and 
then not content with the decision, begins litigating the 
same issue again in the federal district court. The Brillhart 
Abstention Doctrine applies only to circumstances involving 
a federal suit addressing state issues under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act with parties who are also parties to a pending 
parallel state proceeding. The Colorado River Abstention 
Doctrine is inapplicable when substantially the same parties 
are not litigating substantially the same issues in a state 
forum. Colorado River is inapplicable if the state proceed-
ings have terminated or if the federal plaintiff was not a 
party to the state action. 
In order to illustrate the application of these doctrines, 
focus will now tum toward the case of Cheffer v. 
McGregor. l88 In Cheffer, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals allowed federal intervention to block enforcement of a 
state court injunction that established "buffer zones" around 
a Florida abortion clinic.1s9 The state court injunction, 
styled Women's Health Care Center, Inc. v. Operation Res-
cue/90 involved a conflict that arose when abortion oppo-
nents began picketing the Aware Woman's Center for 
Choice, an abortion clinic located in a residential neighbor-
188. 6 F.3d 705 (11th Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 41 
F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane). 
189. Although the holding in Chef{'er was vacated, the Eleventh Circuit did so 
to allow the district court to consider what impact, if any, the United States 
Supreme Court decision of Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 
753 (1994), had on the holding. 
190. 626 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1993), rev. in part, aff. in part sub nom, Madsen v. 
Woman's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753. 
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hood in Melbourne, Florida. In September of 1992, the state 
court judge entered a permanent injunction prohibiting cer-
tain named defendants from trespassing upon the private 
property of the clinic and from physically blocking, imped-
ing, or obstructing access to or egress from the abortion clin-
iC.19l During February and March of 1993, a new campaign 
was launched against the abortion clinic. The original 
named defendants were not involved in this renewed picket-
ing effort.192 However, in April, state court judge Robert B. 
McGregor issued an amended permanent injunction directed 
against the same previously named defendants and those 
acting "in concert" with them.193 This new injunction creat-
191. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 666. 
192. See Mathew D. Staver, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test, 14 ST. 
LoUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 465, 466-69 (1995). 
193. The injunction was directed against Operation Rescue, Operation Rescue 
America, Operation Goliath, Ed Martin, Bruce Cadle, Pat Mahoney, Randall 
Terry, Judy Madsen, Shirley Hobbs, and all persons acting in concert or par-
ticipation with them or on their behalf, with notice in any manner or by any 
means of the order. The injunction then enjoined the defendants from the fol-
lowing: 
(1) At all times on all days, from entering the premises and prop-
erty of the Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc .... 
(2) At all times on all days, from blocking, impeding, inhibiting, 
or in any other manner obstructing or interfering with access to, in-
gress into and egress from any building or parking lot of the Clinic. 
(3) At all times on all days, from congregating, picketing, patrol-
ling, demonstrating or entering that portion of public right-of-way or 
private property within thirty-six (36) feet of the property line of the 
Clinic . . . An exception to the 36-foot buffer zone is the area immedi-
ately adjacent to the Clinic on the east. . . . The [defendantsl ... 
must remain at least five (5) feet from the Clinic's east line. Another 
exception to the 36-foot buffer zone relates to the record title owners 
of the property to the north and west of the Clinic. The prohibition 
against entry into the 36 foot buffer zones does not apply to such 
persons and their invitees. The other prohibitions contained herein do 
apply, if such owners and their invitees are acting in concert with the 
[defendantsl .... 
(4) During the hours of 7:30 a.m. through noon, on Mondays 
through Saturdays, during surgical procedures and recovery periods, 
from singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, 
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds or images 
observable to or within earshot of the patients inside the Clinic. 
(5) At all times on all days, in an area within three-hundred 
(300) feet of the Clinic, from physically approaching any person seek-
ing the services of the Clinic unless such person indicates a desire to 
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ed a thirty-six-foot "buffer zone" surrounding the abortion 
clinic encompassing a public right-of-way, public sidewalk 
and street. The named defendants and those "acting in con-
cert" with them were forbidden from entering this speech-
free zone. The state court injunction also prohibited any pro-
life image that could be observed from within the clinic, and 
required that the pro-life speaker first receive consent from 
communicate by approaching or by inquiring of the [defendants]. In 
the event of such invitation, the [defendants] may engage in communi-
cations consisting of conversation of a nonthreatening nature and by 
the delivery of literature within the three-hundred (300) foot area but 
in no event within the 36 foot buffer zone. Should any individual 
decline such communication, otherwise known as "sidewalk counseling," 
that person shall have the absolute right to leave or walk away and 
the [defendants] shall not accompany such person, encircle, surround, 
harass, threaten or physically or verbally abuse those individuals who 
choose not to communicate with them. 
(6) At all times on all days, from approaching, congregating, pick-
eting, patrolling, demonstrating or using bullhorns or other sound 
amplification equipment within three-hundred (300) feet of the resi-
dence of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, owners or agents, or 
blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other manner, 
temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or driveways of 
the residences of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, owners or 
agents, or blocking or attempting to block, barricade, or in any other 
manner, temporarily or otherwise, obstruct the entrances, exits or 
driveways or the residences of any of the [Clinic's] employees, staff, 
owners or agents. The [defendants] and those acting in concert with 
them are prohibited from inhibiting or impeding or attempting to 
impede, temporarily or otherwise, the free ingress or egress of persons 
to any street that provides the sole access to the street on which 
those residences are located. 
(7) At all times on all days, from physically abusing, grabbing, 
intimidating, harassing, touching, pushing, shoving, crowding or as-
saulting persons entering or leaving, working at or using services at 
the [Abortion] Clinic or trying to gain access to, or leave, any of the 
homes of owners, staff or patients of the Clinic. 
(8) At all times on all days, from harassing, intimidating or phys-
ically abusing, assualting or threatening any present or former doctor, 
health care professional, or other staff member, employee or volunteer 
who assits in providing services at the [Abortion] Clinic. 
(9) At all times on all days, from encouraging, inciting, or secur-
ing other person to commit any of the prohibited acts listed herein. 
Madsen, 114 S. Ct. 2521-22; Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., 626 So. 
2d 664; 679-80 (1993). A map attached to the injunction indicated a buffer zone 
included a public sidewalk in front of the clinic as well as a public street and 
adjacent right-of-way. See Operation Rescue, 626 So. 2d at 682; Staver, supra 
note 192, at 486. 
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any person associated with, or seeking services from, the 
clinic before speaking or distributing literature to them 
within a three-hundred-foot buffer zone around the clinic. A 
three-hundred-foot buffer zone was also placed around any 
residential area where any owner, employee, or volunteer 
lived. 194 
After the issuance of the amended permanent injunc-
tion, a number of pro-life individuals were arrested for en-
tering the thirty-six foot buffer zone. Myrna Cheffer was not 
among those arrested. However, she filed suit in federal 
district court against the state court judge, seeking to enjoin 
enforcement of the state court injunction because the vague-
ness and overbreadth of the injunction caused her to fear 
prosecution under the injunction. Cheffer stated she did not 
condone nor participate in trespassing or blockading activi-
ties. However, she feared prosecution for violating the order 
through application of the "in concert" section by merely en-
tering the thirty-six foot buffer zone. Cheffer stated that she 
knew of others who were neither named in the injunction 
nor acted in concert with any of the named defendants but 
who had been prosecuted under the injunction after entering 
the buffer zone expressing a pro-life message. Indeed, during 
court proceedings the state court judge stated that the in-
junction was intended to apply against anyone with a "pro-
life" view. 195 Cheffer therefore brought suit in federal court 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state 
court injunction. l96 
194. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 760. 
195. Id. at 793-797 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 
F.3d 705, 711 (1993); Mathew D. Staver, Injunctive Relief and the Madsen Test, 
14 ST. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REV. 465, 476 (1995). Courts lack "equitable power to 
issue an injunction that binds the world at large." McKusick v. City of Mel-
bourne, 96 F.3d 478, 484, n. 5 (11th Cir. 1996). See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. 
v. National Labor Relations Bd., 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1944) ("The courts ... may 
not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to make punishable 
the conduct of persons who act independently and whose rights have not be 
adjudged according to the law."); Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 
(2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("[A court] cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large, 
no matter how broadly it words its decree."). The Supreme Court has also held 
that an injunction against independent non parties may violate "established 
principles of equity, jurisdiction and procedure." Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of 
Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 477 (1934). 
196. Cheffer asked the federal court to enjoin enforcement of the "in concert" 
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In Cheffer the defendant argued that the Abstention 
Doctrine should bar Cheffer's federal suit.197 First, the de-
fendant argued that since Cheffer was represented by the 
same attorney who represented the state court defendants, 
Cheffer's interests would be adequately defended. Second, 
Cheffer could intervene in the ongoing state proceedings. 
Third, Cheffer could file an amicus brief. Finally, the defen-
dant argued that imposing a federal injunction against a 
state injunction could ultimately result in the state court 
judge being found in contempt of a federal court order if the 
state court continued to enforce the state ordered injunction. 
According to the defendant, allowing such a clash between 
the federal and state systems would cause a calamitous 
result. 
In the district court, Cheffer claimed that the injunction 
acted as a prior restraint on her free speech rights, and that 
the threat of prosecution chilled her ability to exercise her 
rights. She sought both declaratory and injunctive relief 
alleging a violation of her civil rights using 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.198 The district court denied motions for a tempo-
rary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, finding 
that the balance of equities did not weigh in Cheffer's favor. 
Cheffer appealed the district court decision to the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that Cheffer had 
standing to sue, that the Abstention Doctrine did not apply, 
provision of the state court injunction from being applied against anyone who 
merely espoused a pro-life viewpoint if they were not actively aiding and abet-
ting the named state court defendants. Alternatively, Cheffer requested declara-
tory relief. Specifically, Cheffer asked the federal court declare that the "in 
concert" provision could not be applied against any person with a pro-life view 
without proof that the demonstrator knowingly aided and abetted the state 
court defendants. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 705. 
197. [d. at 709. 
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. provides in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, 
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1997). 
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and that she met the necessary criteria for injunctive re-
lief. 199 
A The Application of Pullman 
Pullman and its progeny dealt with a statute, regula-
tion, or perhaps an ordinance but never an injunction.2°O In 
Madsen v. Women's Health Center,201 the Supreme Court 
199. See Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709-10. 
200. See Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451 (1987) (concerning a state law controversy involving a city ordinance); Ha-
waii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (discussing the state law issue 
of the constitutionality of the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967); Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (arising from the difficulty with the state's 
public nuisance statute); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970) (discussing the 
constitutionality of state fishing laws and regulations); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 
U.S. 241 (1967) (challenging a New York penal statute). 
201. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). The petitioners in Madsen were some of the same 
named defendants in the state court case known as Women's Health Center, 
Inc. v. Operation Rescue discussed above. The injunction at issue in Madsen 
was the same injunction at issue in Chelfer. The difference between the two 
cases is that Madsen dealt with the named state court defendants while Cheffer 
dealt with the application of the same injunction to non-parties through the "in 
concert" provision. The Supreme Court in Madsen found that as applied to the 
state court defendants the injunction was a content-neutral restriction. This was 
based upon the fact that the injunction took into consideration past actions and 
attempted to restrain thOS!! activities. However, the same state court injunction 
would probably operate as a content-based restriction when applied against 
nonparties who had no past history of illegal behavior. See Machesky v. Bizell, 
414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitting a federal injunction against a state 
court injunction which the federal court found to be unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it lumped protected speech with unprotected speech in such 
a way as to abridge important public interests). "Machesky holds that where an 
injunction is attacked on First Amendment grounds and is facially overbroad, 
abstention for comity and federalism reasons is inappropriate." McKusick, 96 
F.3d at 49 n.6. The McKusick court incorrectly assumed that since the Madsen 
injunction was found to be content-neutral as applied to parties, it was also 
content-neutral as applied to nonparties. McKusick, 96 F.3d at 488-89. The 
Supreme Court in Madsen addressed only parties, and specifically indicated 
that the parties were prohibited from challenging the "in concert" section since 
this did not apply to them. Thus Madsen addressed only the application of the 
injunction to the state defendants, Madsen 512 U.S. at 776, whereas Cheffer 
addressed only the "in concert" provision. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708-11. It is clear 
that a state court injunction taking into consideration past illegal behavior may 
operate as a content-neutral restriction on such activities, but the same injunc-
tion operating like a statute and applied against nonparties without past illegal 
behavior is a content-based restriction. Thus, McKusick misreads the reach of 
the Madsen case. 
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discussed the differences between an injunction and an ordi-
nance or statute. A judge "is charged with fashioning a rem-
edy for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a 
statute addressed to the general public. "202 In discussing 
the "obvious differences. .. between an injunction and a 
generally applicable ordinance," the Court noted that an 
ordinance reflects a legislative preference to promote a par-
ticular societal interest whereas an injunction is a remedy 
"imposed for violations . .. of a legislative or judicial de-
cree. "203 For purposes of applying Pullman, the differences 
between an injunction and a statute are really irrelevant, 
except any injunction has already been favored with a judi-
cial decree while a statute may have never had its day in 
court. In Pullman, the Court stated that the question of 
state law rested with the Texas Supreme Court because the 
interpretation of the statute was "far from c1ear."2D4 The 
Court expressed concern that a later ruling by the state 
court would result in an apparent contradiction requiring 
the issue to be relitigated in the federal court forum.205 
Pullman may apply when the state law is subject to more 
than one interpretation and the state courts have not had 
the opportunity to interpret its meaning. However, an in-
junction, by its very nature, has already been crafted by a 
state court. Pullman should rarely, if ever, apply to a state 
court injunction.206 In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,207 the 
202. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 762. A state court injunction constitutes state action 
even if both opposing parties are private actors. See, e.g., New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Gresham 
Park Community v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1981); Henry v. 
First National Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1979). 
203. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 764. 
204. 312 U.S. at 499. 
205. See id. at 499-500. 
206. In Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc., F.3d 1998 WL 177955. 
(6th Cir. 1998), the Sixth Circuit, in a case substantially similar to the facts 
raised in Cheffer, found that none of the Abstention Doctrines applied, but then 
noted, under the principles of comity and federalism outlined in the Pullman 
Abstention Doctrine, federal courts should abstain from entering an injunction 
against a state court until the state court had an opportunity to clarify the 
reach of the injunction to nonparties. Id at 8. Though the Pullman Abstention 
Doctrine applies in a case addressing an ambiguous statute which the courts 
have not had the opportunity to address, Pullman generally should not apply 
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Supreme Court clearly settled the issue of how a federal 
court is to weigh the clarity of the state law embroiled in a 
constitutional controversy before deciding whether Pullman 
applies. In Constantineau, a law enforcement officer posted a 
notice to all liquor stores forbidding the sale of alcohol to the 
federal plaintiff for one year.208 The federal plaintiff was 
not provided notice or the opportunity for a hearing. 209 
Though urged to apply Pullman and avoid the constitutional 
question, the Court instead found the practice of posting 
notices unconstitutional.21o Since the statute was clear and 
unambiguous, Pullman did not apply.211 Pullman absten-
tion is only appropriate when state law is unclear.212 
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.213 The state argued 
when a court injunction is at issue since the court has obviously had the 
opportunity to address the matter. Moreover, a nonparty generally does not 
have the opportunity to request modification or clarification to a state injunc-
tion. However, the court in Gottfried pointed to an unpublished Ohio case 
which ru!ed that an original action in prohibition could be used to challenge an 
injunction that restricts the free speech of a nonparty. Gottfried 1988 WL 
177955 at 6. 
207. 400 U.S. 433 (1971). 
208. See id. at 435. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 437. The Court found that the facts of the case demanded an 
opportunity for due process. The statute lacked any provision for the victim of 
the posting to be heard. See id. at 437-39. 
211. See id. at 439. 
212. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 438 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 
528, 534 (1965». 
213. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). Hawaii Hous. Auth. involved a factually complicated 
constitutional challenge to the Hawaii Land Reform Act, which was designed to 
redistribute the landownership of Hawaiians more evenly since the vast majori-
ty of the land in Hawaii was owned by a very few people. See id. at 231-35. In 
Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc., 1998 WL 177955 (6th Cir. 1998), 
the Sixth Circuit, in a case substantially similar to the facts raised in Cheifer, 
found that none of the Abstention Doctrines applied, but then noted, under the 
principles of comity and federalism outlined in the Pullman Abstention Doc-
trine, federal courts should abstain from entering an injunction against a state 
court until the state court had an opportunity to clarify the reach of the 
injunction to nonparties. Id. at *8. Though the Pullman Abstention Doctrine 
applies in a case addressing an ambiguous statute which the courts have not 
had the opportunity to address, Pullman generally should not apply when a 
court injunction is at issue since the court has obviously had the opportunity to 
address the matter. Moreover, a nonparty generally does not have the opportu-
nity to request modification or clarification to a state injunction. However, the 
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that the Court should apply Pullman and avoid reaching the 
constitutional issues because the controversy involved state 
law.214 In rejecting this argument, the Court found 
Pullman inapplicable because the state statute was clear 
and unambiguous.215 Pullman is appropriate when the 
state law is unclear.216 Pullman is not appropriate where 
the state statute cannot be interpreted in such a way as to 
avoid reaching the constitutional question.217 Because ab-
stention is the exception and not the rule, the Pullman Ab-
stention Doctrine is limited to unclear issues of state 
law.218 
In the Cheffer case, the issues of state law are not, and 
cannot be, unclear. According to Pullman, the ostensible 
basis for federal court abstention in reaching the merits of 
the constitutional claim was to allow the Texas Supreme 
Court the opportunity to resolve the uncertain area of law. 
In Cheffer, the state court crafted the injunction Pullman 
abstention is therefore inappropriate.219 
B. The Application of Younger 
1. The Pending Prosecution 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
Younger Abstention Doctrine220 did not block Cheffer's suit. 
"The Supreme Court has directed that Federal Courts 
should not intervene in ongoing state proceedings 'when the 
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not 
court in Gottfried pointed to a recently decided Ohio case which ruled that an 
original action in prohibition could be used to challenge an injunction that 
restricts the free speech of a nonparty. [d. at *6. 
214. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 236. The state also advanced a 
Younger abstention argument. See id. 
215. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 237. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. at 236. The Court, by inference, said that if the state statute is 
"fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary" the constitu-
tional issue, then Pullman abstention is appropriate. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 
U.S. at 236 (quoting Harman, 380 U.S. 528, 534 (1965». 
218. See Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 236. 
219. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Cheffer did not address the 
Pullman Abstention Doctrine. 
220. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 37. 
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suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief."'221 
"Younger abstention is only appropriate, however, when the 
federal constitutional claims at issue can be raised by the 
federal plaintiff in an on-going state court proceeding. "222 
Noting that Cheffer had no remedy in state court "except to 
subject herself to a criminal contempt citation," the court 
reasoned that Younger abstention was inappropriate and 
that the district court had jurisdiction to hear Cheffer's 
claim.223 The Eleventh Circuit was aware that similar is-
sues presented in the federal court were pending in a con-
temporaneous state court proceeding before the Florida Su-
preme Court.224 However, the Eleventh Circuit did not ap-
ply the Younger Abstention Doctrine, nor did it require that 
Cheffer intervene in the state court action to have her con-
stitutional claim adjudicated. 
In order to correctly ascertain whether the principles of 
Younger apply, the litigant must first recognize the crucial 
distinguishing factor involving a pending state proceeding 
against the federal plaintiff. The federal party in Younger 
"was indicted in a California state court," prior to filing a 
complaint requesting a federal court to enjoin the pending 
state prosecution against him.225 Younger articulates the 
"national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin 
pending state court proceedings except under special circum-
stances."226 However, the Younger Court limited its holding 
by stating: "We express no view about the circumstances 
under which federal courts may act when there is no prose-
221. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971». 
222. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709. See also Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton 
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, (1986) (holding that Younger applies as long 
as in the course of the state proceedings the federal plaintiff would have a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the constitutional claim). 
223. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 709. 
224. The same amended permanent injunction was being challenged in both 
state and federal court. The named defendants challenged the constitutionality 
of the injunction in state court, while Cheffer, who was not a party to the 
state court proceeding, challenged application of the injunction to non-parties 
through the "in concert" provision. 
225. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38-39 (1971). 
226. [d. at 41 (emphasis added). 
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cution pending in state courts at the time the federal pro-
ceeding is begun. "227 
The Younger Abstention Doctrine's foundation rests on a 
sensitivity toward the principles of equity, comity, and feder-
alism.228 Younger reflects a respect for state functions, a 
continuation of the federalist principle that the Federal 
Government will function best if the states and their institu-
tions are free to execute their separate functions, and an 
acknowledgment of the fact that the nation is comprised of a 
union of individual state governments.229 Younger ad-
dressed these issues by refusing to allow a federal plaintiff, 
who was a defendant in a pending state criminal prosecu-
tion, to obtain a federal court ruling in the midst of the 
pending state action.230 Separate concurring opinions of 
Justices Stewart and Harlan further explained the parame-
ters of the Younger holding. Noting several cases to which 
the Younger decifJion would apply, Justices Stewart and 
Harlan declared: "In all of these cases, the Court deals only 
with the proper policy to be followed by a federal court when 
asked to intervene by injunction or declaratory judgment in 
a criminal prosecution which is contemporaneously pending 
in a state court."231 As noted by the Court, "a proceeding 
was already pending in the state court, affording Harris an 
opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. "232 Hence, 
the existence of the pending state prosecution was central to 
the Younger decision. 
Furthermore, Younger abstention cases discussing the 
requirement of a pending state proceeding are manifold. In 
the Younger companion case, Samuels v. Mackell,233 the 
Court abstained because the federal plaintiffs were parties 
to a proceeding in state court and had an opportunity to 
raise their constitutional claims therein. As noted by the 
227. [d. 
228. See id. at 43-44. 
229. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975) (discussing Youn-
ger). 
230. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54. 
231. [d. at 55 (Stewart, J., Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
232. [d. at 49. 
233. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). 
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Samuels Court, the federal plaintiffs "in these two cases 
were all indicted in aNew York state court on charges of 
criminal anarchy.,,234 As in Younger, the Samuels Court ex-
pressed "no views on the propriety of declaratory relief when 
no state proceeding is pending at the time the federal suit is 
begun.,,235 In both Younger and Samuels, abstention was 
proper because the federal plaintiffs were also parties to 
state court proceedings which were pending at the time the 
federal suit was initiated. 
For the same reason that Younger applies to the facts in 
Juidice v. Vail/.3S Younger does not apply to the facts of 
Cheffer. In Juidice, a state court party had been found in 
contempt of court as a judgment debtor.237 While still a 
party in the state court, Vail attempted to bring a federal 
action to enjoin enforcement of the statutory provisions au-
thorizing the contempt judgment.238 Again, as in Younger 
and Samuels, the federal plaintiff was a party to a state 
court proceeding which allowed an adequate opportunity to 
present a constitutional claim for relief. 239 
The fact that the federal plaintiffs in the previously 
discussed cases were also party defendants in a pending 
state proceeding is precisely why the Younger Abstention 
Doctrine is inapplicable to Cheffer. Unlike Harris in Youn-
ger, the federal plaintiff in Cheffer was not a party to any 
pending proceeding in state court and had never been arrest-
ed under the state court injunction. 
The federal plaintiff in Steffel v. Thompson240 is almost 
identical to the federal plaintiff in Cheffer. Like the litigant 
in Cheffer, the federal plaintiff in Steffel was not involved in 
any pending state court prosecution.241 Rather, a compan-
ion of Steffel was involved in a pending state prosecu-
234. [d. at 67. 
235. Samuels, 401 U.S. at 73-74. 
236. 430 U.S. 327 (1977). 
237. See id. at 329. 
238. See id. at 330. 
239. See id. at 337. 
240. 415 U.S. 452 (1974). 
241. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 455-56. 
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tion.242 In contrast to the Younger litigants, Steffel had 
been personally threatened with arrest under a Georgia 
criminal trespass statute.243 Though Steffel "desired to re-
turn to the shopping center to distribute handbills, he [did 
not do] so because of his concern that he, too, would be ar-
rested for violation" of the Georgia Statute. 244 
Similarly, in Cheffer, several pro-life protesters had been 
named as defendants in a court ordered injunction bought by 
several abortion clinics. This injunction applied to the 
named defendants and those acting "in concert" with them. 
Ms. Cheffer was not a named defendant. However, she want-
ed to distribute literature and discuss alternatives to abor-
tion on a public sidewalk outside the abortion clinic within 
the thirty-six foot buffer zone. The injunction prohibited the 
named defendants and those acting in concert with them 
from using the public sidewalk.245 The injunction required 
city officials to post a sign stating: "WARNING. Demonstra-
tions and picketing in this area are limited by court order. 
Violators of this court order are subject to arrest."246 The 
local police enforced the injunction by arresting anyone es-
pousing a pro-life message who dared enter the thirty-six 
foot speech free zone. When these non-party arrestees were 
brought before the state judge who issued the injunction, the 
judge stated that his order applied to anyone with a pro-life 
view.247 Ms. Cheffer became aware of how the "in concert" 
section of the injunction was being applied. Though not 
named in the injunction, she feared prosecution under the 
injunction.248 Accordingly, Ms. Cheffer is unlike the three 
242. See id. at 454-59. 
243. See id. at 456-59. 
244. [d. at 456. 
245. The state court judge loosely applied the "in concert" provision to any 
person entering the thirty-six foot buffer zone who espoused a pro-life view 
regardless of whether they were actively aiding and abetting the named defen-
dants. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 783-820 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 711 (11th Cir. 1993); 
Staver, supra note 192, at 476. 
246. Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d. at 680. 
247. See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Appendix to 
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. See id. at 815-20. 
248. See Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 708. 
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federal intervenors in Younger whom the Court dismissed 
for lack of a genuine controversy.249 
The Younger Court characterized the allegations of the 
threat of prosecution by the other three plaintiff.intervenors 
as merely "imaginary or speculative."250 In contrast, the 
Steffel Court held that Mr. Steffel's allegations of the threat 
of prosecution could not be characterized as either specula-
tive or imaginary.251 The Steffel Court went on to state 
that "the prosecution of petitioner's handbilling companion is 
ample demonstration that petitioner's concern with arrest 
has not been 'chimerical. ",252 
In like manner, Cheffer's claims were neither specula-
tive, nor imaginary. Because other unnamed pro-life protest-
ers not associated with the named defendants had been 
prosecuted under the "in concert" provision of the injunction, 
Cheffer's fear of prosecution was legitimate and real. Ap-
proximately fifty other non·party pro·life protesters were 
arrested for entering the so-called "buffer zone. "253 Conse-
249. See id. at 708-09. 
250. Younger, 401 U.S. at 41. 
251. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). 
252. [d. at 459 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961». 
253. Cheffer, 6 F.3d at 707. State and federal courts may issue an injunction 
against a defendant and those acting "in concert" with the defendant. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 65(d). Rule 65(d) was patterned after the Clayton Act, which was 
enacted to curtail abuses of federal strike injunctions. H.R. REP. No. 612 
(1912). Judge Learned Hand once observed: 
[A court] cannot lawfully enjoin the world at large no matter how 
broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro 
tanto brutum fulmen [sound and fury signifying nothing], and the 
persons enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign 
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisidiction is limited to those 
over whom it gets personal service, and who therefore have their day 
in court. Thus, the only occasion when a person not a party may be 
punished, is when he has helped to bring about, not merely what the 
decree has forbidden, because it may have gone too far, but what it 
has power to forbid, an act of a party. This means that the respon-
dent must either abet the defendant, or must be legally identified 
with him . . . This is far from being a formal distinction; it goes deep 
into the powers of a court of equity ... It is by ignoring such proce-
dural limitations that the injunction of a court of equity may by slow 
steps be made to realize the worst fears of those who are jealous of 
its prerogative. 
Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1930) (emphasis add-
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quently, unlike the three plaintiff-intervenors in Younger, 
Ms. Cheffer had an "acute, live controversy" with the state 
ed). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized certain limitations of 
an injunction: 
It is true that persons not technically agents or employees may be 
specifically enjoined from knowingly aiding a defendant in performing 
an act if their relation is that of associate or confederate. Since such 
persons are legally identified with the defendant and privy to his con-
tempt, the provision merely makes explicit as to them that which the 
law already implies. But by extending the injunction to 'all persons to 
whom notice of the injunction should come,' the District Court as-
sumed to make punishable as a contempt the conduct of persons who 
act idependently and whose rights have not been adjudged according 
to law . . . To subject them to such peril violates established princi-
ples of equity jurisdiction and procedure. 
Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, Ohio, 291 U.S. 431, 437 (1934). The 
injunction at issue in Cheffer sought in essence to enjoin the entire world. The 
state court judge ordered that a sign be posted around the abortion clinic stat-
ing: "WARNING. Demonstrations and picketing in this area are limited by 
court order. Violators of this court order are subject to arrest." Operation Res-
cue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 680 (Fla. 1993). Unfortunate-
ly, some courts have not been careful when crafting and enforcing injunctions. 
Courts should be cautious when applying injunctions to those acting "in con-
cert." See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 13 (1945) (stating 
that a court "may not grant an enforcement order or injunction so broad as to 
make punishable the conduct of persons who act independently and whose 
rights have not been adjudged according to law"); Swetland v. Curry, 188 F.2d 
841, 843 (6th Cir. 1951) (stating that a non-party "may not be held guilty of 
contempt for violating an injunction unless he is shown to be identified with or 
is an aider or abetter of the party originally enjoined."); Kean v. Hurley, 179 
F.2d 888, 890 (8th Cir. 1950) (stating that "persons who are not parties to the 
injunction or in privity with them . . . are not bound by the decree and cannot 
be held liable for acts done contrary thereto even though the decree assumes to 
bind them."); Petersen v. Fee Int'l Ltd., 435 F. Supp. 938, 942 (W.D. Oklo 1975) 
(discussing how Rule 65(d) follows the common law rule that non-parties are 
bound by an injunction only if they are legally identified with a named party 
or aided or abetted the named party in his violation of the decree); Wright V. 
County Sch. Bd. of Greensville County, Va., 309 F. Supp. 671, 677 (E.D. Va 
1970) rev'd 442 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1971) (discussing how Rule 65(d) fixes the 
scope of valid injunctions, and terms in a decree exceeding the rule are of no 
effect; non-parties who act independently are not subject to sanctions); Baltz V. 
Fair, 178 F. Supp. 691, 693 (N.D. TIL 1959) (stating that "Persons who are not 
parties to the injunction or in privity with them . . . are not bound by the 
decree in so far as it operates in personam and cannot be held for acts done 
contrary to its terms"); Chilsolm V. Caines, 147 F. Supp. 188, 191 (E.D.S.C. 
1954) (stating that an "injunction cannot issue to bind the public at large" even 
though it purports to do so); Baltimore Transit CO. V. Flynn, 50 F. Supp. 382, 
386 (D. Md. 1943) (stating that a court "cannot lawfully enjoin the world at 
large"). 
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regarding her constitutionally protected rights. 254 
A cursory examination of Hicks v. Miranda,255 might 
compel one to assert that the Court's holding argues for 
application of the Younger Abstention Doctrine to the facts 
of Cheffer. In Hicks, the Supreme Court noted that the "prin-
ciples of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force" when 
"state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal 
plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any 
proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in 
the federal court. ,,256 Because of a violation of the obscenity 
standards, the federal plaintiff in Hicks faced possible crimi-
nal prosecution at the time the federal lawsuit was initiated. 
However, although the federal plaintiffs employees were 
charged, the state criminal proceedings against the plaintiff 
had not yet begun. The state criminal proceedings were not 
begun until after the federal plaintiff filed a complaint in 
federal court. The fact that the Hicks federal plaintiff was a 
party to an ongoing state proceeding, though the state crimi-
nal proceedings were not initiated until after the federal suit 
was initiated, is a crucial fact that distinguishes Hicks from 
the facts surrounding Cheffer. Again, Cheffer was not in-
volved in any state proceedings, nor was prosecution against 
her about to commence. Therefore, the Younger Abstention 
Doctrine is inapplicable to Cheffer. 
Since Cheffer was not involved in any pending state 
proceeding, she had no opportunity to adjudicate her consti-
254. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971); see Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 
F.3d 705, 708-09 (11th Cir. 1993). 
255. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). The Court said that the federal plaintiff "had a 
substantial stake in the state proceedings. . . . .. [d. at 348. Such language 
might seem to indicate that a federal plaintiff, not a party in the state pro-
ceeding, possessing a "substantial stake," could be barred from alljudicating her 
constitutional claim in federal court under Younger analysis. However, Hicks 
does not stand for the proposition that a federal plaintiff who has an interest 
in the outcome of a pending state proceeding, although not a party, is barred 
from bringing an action in federal court. To the contrary, the facts in Hicks 
indicate that the federal plaintiffs's employees had already become enmeshed in 
ongoing state proceedings. The Hicks federal plaintiff had already been a target 
of state investigation and was on the verge of being charged by the state. The 
mere fact that the Hicks federal plaintiff beat the state officials to the court 
house was not enough to exempt him from the Younger Abstention Doctrine. 
256. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349. 
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tutional claims. In the absence of federal court intervention, 
Ms. Cheffer would face the difficult choice of either inten-
tionally flouting state law,257 or foregoing her constitution-
ally protected activity in order to avoid becoming entangled 
in a state proceeding. However, as noted in Steffel, "it is not 
necessary that petitioner first expose himself to actual arrest 
or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute which he 
claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights. JJ258 
The Supreme Court's opinion in Steffel is directly on point 
and controls the outcome of whether the principle of Younger 
applies to the facts of Cheffer. Clearly, abstention is not 
appropriate when a party lacks the opportunity to vindicate 
257. There is a significant difference between an unconstitutional statute or 
ordinance and an injunction. According to the United States Supreme Court, 
one may violate an unconstitutional statute or ordinance at will and later chal-
lenge its constitutionality. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 
147 (1969). Any fine or conviction levied for the violation will be null and void 
ab initio once the law is ruled unconstitutional. However, if one is found in 
contempt of violating an injunction that is later ruled unconstitutional, the con-
tempt finding and punishment remain. See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 
307 (1967). This is known as the collateral bar rule. Simply put, a party sub-
ject to a court order must obey it or face contempt. The court order must be 
respected until it is later vacated or declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Walker, 
388 U.S. at 307 (sustaining contempt conviction for violation of an ex parte 
injunction and upholding the lower court's application of the collateral bar rule 
even where the equities cut so dramatically in favor of the accused 
contemnors); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947) 
("an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and per-
son must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper 
proceedings"); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 (1922) ("It is for the court of 
first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its 
decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or a higher 
court, its orders based on its decisions are to be respected, and disobedience of 
them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished"); In re Establishment 
Inspection of Hem Iron Works, 881 F.2d 722, 726 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Novak, 
932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Disobedience of an invalid court order 
may be punished as a criminal contempt"); In re Providence Journal Co., 820 
F.2d 1342, 1346 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g en bane, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st 
Cir. 1987). The collateral bar rule is premised on the idea of preventing chaos 
and respect for the rule of law. See Walker, 388 U.S. at 320-21. The only ex-
ceptions to the collateral bar rule are lack of subject matter or personal juris-
diction. Some courts have found another exception "where the injunction was 
transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense to validity." In re Provi-
dence Journal Co., 820 F.2d at 1347 (quoting Walker, 388 U.S. at 315); see also 
In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works, 881 F.2d at 727. 
258. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974). 
HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1197 1997
1997] Balancing Federal Court Intervention 1197 
their constitutional claims in a court proceeding. To apply 
Younger to such a scenario offends the core of "Our Federal-
ism." As reaffirmed in Steffel: 
In the instant case, principles of federalism not only 
do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. 
Requiring the federal courts totally to step aside 
when no state criminal prosecution is pending 
against a federal plaintiff would turn federalism on 
its head. When federal claims are premised on 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) - as they are 
here - we have not required exhaustion of state judi-
cial or administrative remedies, recognizing the para-
mount role Congress has assigned to the federal 
courts to protect constitutional rights. But exhaustion 
of state remedies is precisely what would be required 
if both federal injunctive and declaratory relief were 
unavailable in a case where no state prosecution had 
been commenced.259 
. Without the ability to pursue her claim in federal court, 
Cheffer found herself "placed between the Scylla of inten-
tionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing 
what [s]he . . . believes to be constitutionally protected activ-
ity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in [a] ... criminal 
proceeding. ,,260 
When confronted with such a situation, the Supreme 
Court in Wooley v. Maynard said, "Younger does not bar 
federal jurisdiction."261 In Wooley, the defendant was ar-
rested, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced for violating a 
state law which required the display of a particular license 
plate on all automobiles registered within the state. After 
serving his sentence, he filed a complaint in federal court 
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the state statute on the 
basis that the statute was a violation of his First Amend-
ment rights. In addressing the principles of equitable re-
259. [d. at 472·73 (internal quotes omitted). 
260. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710 (1977) (quoting Steffel v. Thomp-
Bon, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974». 
261. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711. 
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straint enunciated in Younger, the Supreme Court noted 
that the federal plaintiff was not attempting to annul the 
results of a state trial, but rather was trying to obtain pro-
spective relief to preclude future prosecution under the stat-
ute. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff could not "be 
denied consideration of a federal remedy."262 Likewise, 
Cheffer was not seeking to annul a state trial but she was 
seeking prospective relief. 
Some have argued that federal courts should abstain 
even when there is no pending state court proceeding when 
the federal plaintiff has not first attempted to intervene in 
the pending state courts or brought a separate action in the 
state system. This argument was raised and rejected out-
right in Hoover v. Wagner. 263 The facts in Hoover are very 
similar to the facts in Cheffer. The Hoover case also involved 
a state court injunction issued against certain named pro-life 
protestors and those acting "in concert" with them.264 Like 
Cheffer, the injunction in Hoover created a buffer zone 
around abortion clinics. State officials, including the state 
courts, enforced the injunction against anyone espousing a 
pro-life view entering the buffer zone who spoke with or 
even glanced toward a nearby defendant who was named in 
262. Id. 
263. 47 F.3d 845, 847 (7th eir. 1995). The facts in Hoover involved two pro· 
life picketers and a journalist who brought suit in federal court challenging a 
state court iI\iunction which restricted certain named defendants and those 
acting in concert with them from picketing certain named abortion clinics. The 
federal plaintiffs were not parties to the state court iI\iunction and had never 
been named in any state court proceeding, but they claimed they were in fear 
of arrest for picketing in and around the abortion clinics and for taking 
photographs of the incidents. The state court injunction prohibited certain 
named defendants "and all persons acting in concert with them and having 
received notice of' the injunction from trespassing on or blocking access to 
specified abortion clinics; from congregating, demonstrating, or otherwise pro-
testing with twenty-five feet of the entrances to the clinics; from photographing 
license plates of cars of those using the clinics; and from refusing to desist 
from "sidewalk counseling" at the request of the person being counseled. The 
plaintiffs further claimed that law enforcement officers and the state courts 
judges had applied the injunction to anyone standing in the vicinity of a named 
defendant without any additonal proof of active or knowing association with the 
named defendants. Moreover, the journalist alleged he had been threatened 
with arrest for taking photographs. 
264. Hoover, 47 F.3d at 846-47. 
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the state court injunction.265 Fearing arrest, the federal 
plaintiffs, who were not named in the state court injunction 
and were not involved in any state court proceeding, brought 
suit in federal court seeking injunctive and declaratory re-
lief.266 
Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals opined that "[t]he core of the Younger doctrine is 
the proposition that a person who is being prosecuted by a 
state for violating its laws is not allowed to derail the prose-
cution by bringing a suit in federal court to enjoin the prose-
cution on the ground that the state statute on which it is 
based is unconstitutional."267 The Younger Abstention Doc-
trine only applies to pending state court proceedings or "liti-
gation between the same parties . . . raising the same issues [.r66 In Hoover, the federal defendants argued that the 
265. See ill. at 847. 
266. Because the federal plaintiffs were not named in the state court injunc-
tion and had not yet been arrested for violating its terms under the "in con-
cert" provision, the federal court defendants argued the case should be dis-
missed for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless found that plain-
tiffs did have standing: 
All that a plaintiff need show to establish standing to sue is a reason-
able probability - not a certainty - of suffering tangible harm unless 
he obtains the relief that he is seeking in the suit . . . Arrest, prose-
cution, and conviction are tangible harms, and so is abandoning one's 
constitutional right of free speech in order to avert those harms. 
Therefore the question on which standing turns in this case is the 
probability that unless the plaintiffs obtain a declaration or injunction 
limiting the enforcement of the Wisconsin state court's injunction, they 
will either forgo their right of free speech or be arrested, prosecuted, 
and perhaps even convicted. We cannot reckon the probability of these 
consequences as being low. The two abortion protestors in the trio of 
plaintiffs have made clear that they want to go right up to the line 
that separates legal from illegal protest. If that line is drawn in 
vague and wavering fashion by the state court injunction, or if the 
Milwaukee police and other law enforcement officers interpret the 
injunction in a way that subjects to arrest people who stop just short 
of the line, then either these plaintiffs will be arrested if they insist 
on going right up to the line, or they will draw well back from the 
line and as a result (since it is quite possible that the injunction goes 
as far as it could without violating the First Amendment) forgo the 
full exercise of their consitutional rights." 
[d. at 847 (citations omitted). 
267. [d. at 848. 
268. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440 (1977) (emphasis added). 
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federal court should abstain from hearing the case because 
the plaintiffs could either file the same complaint in state 
court or intervene in one of 'several state court proceed-
ings.269 "There is no duty to intervene to stave off the use 
of a case as res judicata against one[self]. "270 "Certainly 
nothing in Younger or the cases following it suggests that 
persons claiming a violation of their federal rights have an 
obligation before turning to federal court to see whether 
there is some state court proceeding that they might join in 
order to present their federal claims there."271 Younger 
does not impose a duty on the federal plaintiff to intervene 
in other suits pending in state court of which the federal 
plaintiff is not a party. 
Requiring a federal plaintiff to discover and then join 
any factually similar pending state action would create time-
liness constraints. In addition, if similarly situated plaintiffs 
could be forced to join an ongoing state proceeding they 
would be constrained by the allegations and pleadings of the 
pending state proceeding. Plaintiffs such as Cheffer and 
Hoover would be unfairly limited by the claims and defenses 
raised by the original state parties. Such a heavy burden 
would result in the denial of constitutionally protected free-
doms and the inability to seek adequate redress. Requiring 
potential federal plaintiffs to seek out and join any factually 
similar state proceeding would certainly result in the denial 
of constitutionally protected rights. 
In Steffel, the United States Supreme Court was in-
formed during Oral Argument that the identical issue was 
pending in the state courtS.272 The Steffel court pointed to 
the facts in Roe v. Wade,273 noting that while the pending 
prosecution of a' physician under Texas law was found to 
render his action for declaratory and injunctive relief imper-
missible, this fact did not prevent the Supreme Court from 
granting Roe, against whom no action was pending, a de-
269. See Hoover, 47 F.3d at 848. 
270. [d. at 848. See also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). 
271. [d. 
272. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 n.22 (1974). 
273. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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claratory judgment that the statute was unconstitution-
al.274 Steffel did not require the federal plaintiff to seek out 
and join the ongoing state proceeding. An action may be 
brought in federal court so long as the plaintiff is not a party 
to ongoing state proceedings. 
2. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 
The Supreme Court in Steffel noted the difference be-
tween injunctive and declaratory relief by observing that the 
lower court erred in treating the requests for injunctive and 
declaratory relief as a single issue.275 
[W]hen no state prosecution is pending and the only 
question is whether declaratory relief is appropriate 
[,] ... the congressional scheme that makes the fed-
eral courts the primary guardians of constitutional 
rights, and the expressed congressional authorization 
of declaratory relief, afforded because it is a less 
harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction, be-
come the factors of primary significance.276 
In analyzing the standard for declaratory relief, the 
Court noted that a pervasive sense of nationalism led to the 
enactment of certain civil rights laws and further found that 
the new exertion of federal power was no longer entrusted to 
the enforcement of state agencies.277 In order to create a 
system which would permit federal courts to be the ultimate 
arbiters of federal constitutional rights against governmen-
tal intrusion, Congress, in 1934, enacted the Declaratory 
Judgment Act.278 The Steffel Court observed the following: 
That Congress plainly intended declaratory relief to 
act as an alternative to the strong medicine of the 
injunction and to be utilized to test the constitution-
274. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 471 n.19; Roe, 410 U.S. at 125-27, 166. 
275. See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 463. 
276. [d. at 463 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 104 (1971) (separate 
opinion of Brennan, J.) (brackets in the original». 
277. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 464 n.13. 
278. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-12 (1997); Steffel, 415 U.S. at 466. 
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ality of state criminal statutes in cases where injunc-
tive relief would be unavailable is amply evidenced by 
the legislative history of the Act .... 279 
Clearly, the "Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to 
provide an alternative to injunctions against state offi-
cials."280 The Supreme Court held that "'a federal district 
court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the 
merits of the declaratory request irrespective of its conclu-
sion as to the propriety of the issuance of the injunc-
tion.'"281 Additionally, the Steffel Court pointed out that 
"when no state proceeding is pending and thus consider-
ations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality, 
the propriety of granting federal declaratory relief may prop-
erly be considered independently of a request for injunctive 
relief. "282 Indeed, "'different considerations enter into a 
federal court's decision as to declaratory relief, on the one 
hand, and injunctive relief, on the other.'"283 
The "persuasive force of the court's opinion and judg-
ment may lead state prosecutors, courts, and legislators to 
reconsider their respective responsibilities toward the stat-
ute."284 Even though a declaratory judgment has the full 
force and effect of a final judgment, "it is a milder form of 
relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is 
not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inap-
propriate but it is not contempt."285 Requiring federal 
279. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 466. 
280. Id. at 467. 
281. Id. at 468 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 254 
(1943». 
282. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462. 
283. Id. at 469 (quoting Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-55 (1967» (em-
phasis in original). 
284. Steffel, 415 U.S. at 470. 
285. [d. at 471. Some might argue that a federal court should never enjoin 
enforcement of a state court injunction because a federal injunction against a 
state injunction might create a scenario where state police, prosecutors or judg-
es could be held in contempt for enforcing the state court order. However, con-
stitutional rights must not be abandoned simply because the enforcement offi-
cials might be punished for enforcing an unconstitutional injunction. Moreover, 
as noted in Steffel, declaratory relief is an alternative remedy which must be 
separately considered from the request for irijunctive relief. Declaratory relief is 
HeinOnline -- 22 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1203 1997
1997] Balancing Federal Court Intervention 1203 
courts to step aside in situations where the plaintiff is not a 
party to any state civil or criminal prosecution "would turn 
federalism on its head."286 Therefore, according to Steffel, 
"regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, 
federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state 
prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a 
genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal 
statute, whether an attack is made on the constitutionality 
of the statute on its face or as applied. "287 
C. The Application of Rooker-Feldman 
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply to the 
facts of Cheffer because the federal plaintiff did not attempt 
to use the federal forum as an appellate court over the state 
forum. Cheffer was not a party to the ongoing state action 
and therefore did not have the opportunity to appeal the 
state court decision. "The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not 
apply to bar suit in federal court brought by a party that 
was not a party in the preceding action in the state 
COurt."286 Indeed, the Third Circuit in Valenti noted that it 
could find "no authority which would extend the Rooker-
a much milder remedy than injunctive relief. Whereas noncompliance with an 
injunction may result in contempt, noncompliance with a declaratory judgment 
does not result in contempt. At a minimum, a federal plaintiff should be afford-
ed declaratory relief in the right circumstances. 
286. [d. at 472. 
287. [d. at 475. All too often federal courts treat injunctive and declaratory 
relief as a single issue. When a federal plaintiff fails to meet the criteria for 
injunctive relief, courts frequently deny both injunctive and declaratory relief in 
the same sentence without separate analysis. There are many cases where a 
federal plaintiff might not meet the threshold for injunctive relief but should 
still be awarded declaratory relief. To obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff 
generally must prove: (1) likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable 
harm; (3) the harm to the plaintiff greatly outweighs the harm to the defen-
dant and granting the relief is in the public interest; and (4) no adequate rem-
edy at law. Declaratory relief requires none of the four criteria for injunctive 
relief. Violation of an injunction may result in contempt but not so with de-
claratory relief. While an injunction must be complied with, declaratory relief is 
advisory. The difference between an injunction and declaratory relief is like the 
difference between a command and hortatory advice. 
288. U.S. v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Valenti v. 
Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Feldman doctrine to persons not parties to the proceedings 
before the state supreme court. "289 
D. The Application of Brillhart 
The Brillhart Abstention Doctrine applies only to cir-
cumstances involving a federal suit addressing state issues 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act with parties who are 
also parties to a pending parallel state proceeding.290 
Brillhart clearly does not apply to the facts of Cheffer. First, 
consistent with the theme underlying the various aspects of 
absention, Cheffer was not a party to a pending state court 
proceeding. Second, Cheffer dealt with federal constitutional 
questions rather than state law. Third, Cheffer was not par-
allel to the state proceeding because it dealt with the appli-
cation of the injunction to non-parties through the "in con-
cert" provision, while the state case dealt with the applica-
tion of the injunction to parties based on past history. 291 
Finally, while the federal plaintiff in Cheffer requested de-
claratory relief, she also requested injunctive relief. 
E. The Application of Colorado River 
The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine applies only 
when substantially the same parties are litigating substan-
tially the same issues in state court. Colorado River does not 
apply to the facts of Cheffer for two reasons. First, Cheffer 
was not a party to the state court action. There is no obliga-
tion that Cheffer attempt to intervene in the ongoing state 
proceeding in order to vindicate her rights. Second, the is-
sues between the state and federal court, while similar, are 
not substantially identical. The state court parties litigated 
the underlying issue of the constitutionality of the injunc-
tion. That issue obviously involved questions of law and fact. 
The questions of fact revolved around whether there was 
sufficient evidence to support the imposition of an injunc-
289. Valenti, 962 F.2d at 297-98. 
290. See Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942); see also 
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995). 
291. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 775 (1994). 
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tion. The questions of law revolved around whether the 
injunction exceeded constitutional protections. Moreover, the 
litigation in the state court proceeding involved the parties 
and their past actions. The litigation in the federal court 
involved only the application of the "in concert" provision 
which the state parties would not have standing to raise.292 
Because Cheffer is not a party to the ongoing state ac-
tion, and since her concern was focused on the application of 
the "in concert" provision to non-parties, the concerns raised 
in her complaint were not substantially similar to those 
litigated by the parties to the state court action. Therefore, 
the Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is inapplicable. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of the Abstention Doctrine is to pre-
serve the balance between state and federal sovereignty. The 
Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from issuing an 
injunction against a state proceeding except as expressly 
authorized by Congress or where necessary to aid its juris-
diction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment. Civil rights 
actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are specifically ex-
cepted from the Anti-Injunction Act. First Amendment 
claims are therefore not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. 
The Pullman Abstention Doctrine is only applicable 
when the federal court is faced with an ambiguous state law 
susceptible to multiple meanings, one of which may prove 
the statute constitutional and the other may render it un-
constitutional. Pullman does not apply when the state law is 
clear and unambiguous. Moreover, Pullman does not apply 
when the state courts have interpreted the state law, and 
may not apply where the state courts have had the opportu-
nity to interpret the state law but have failed or refused to 
do so. Pullman should never apply to a state-ordered injunc-
tion because, by its very nature, the state court created the 
challenged law. 
292. See id. Named parties do not have standing to challenge an "in concert" 
provision since, by nature of that provision, it applies to non-parties. 
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The Younger Abstention Doctrine does not apply when 
there is no pending state proceeding against the federal 
plaintiff at the time the federal complaint is filed. The 
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine applies only to those 
circumstances where the federal plaintiff attempts to use the 
federal forum as an appellate court over a state court action. 
In other words, if a federal plaintiff begins an action in state 
court, receives a decision from the state court, and instead of 
appealing through the state court system, ceases the state 
action and presents the identical claim in federal court, the 
Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine applies. Rooker-
Feldman is only concerned with the federal plaintiff who be-
gins in the state court system and fails to exhaust the state 
court appellate process. The Brillhart Abstention Doctrine 
applies only to circumstances involving a federal suit ad-
dressing state issues under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
with parties who are also parties to a pending parallel state 
proceeding. The Colorado River Abstention Doctrine is not 
applicable when substantially the same parties are not liti-
gating substantially the same issue in a state forum. Colora-
do River is inapplicable if the state proceedings have termi-
nated or if the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state 
court action. 
One common thread underlying all of the doctrines of 
abstention is that abstention does not apply to a federal 
plaintiff who has never been a party to a state court action. 
Moreover, abstention does not apply to a federal plaintiff 
when there is no pending proceeding in state court against 
the federal plaintiff on the same issue as long as the federal 
plaintiff is not attempting to use the federal forum as an 
appellate court over an unsuccessful partial journey through 
the state court system. A plaintiff has the right to choose 
either the state or federal forum to raise constitutional 
claims. The Abstention Doctrine cannot be used to force a 
federal plaintiff to first seek redress in a state court by ei-
ther filing a complaint there, intervening in another state 
court action, or filing an amicus brief in a pending state 
court proceeding. Despite the fact that a similar federal 
question is pending in a state court action, the federal plain-
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tiff may still seek redress in a federal forum as long as the 
federal plaintiff is not a party to the ongoing state action. 
The purpose of the Abstention Doctrine is to balance 
state and federal sovereignty. According to the Supreme 
Court, the federal courts are supposed to act as the guard-
ians of federal rights. Federal courts have therefore been 
expressly authorized to issue injunctions as a means of re-
dress. Therefore, except in rare circumstances where the 
balance between state and federal comity would be substan-
tially upset, federal courts should not step aside from pro-
tecting federal rights. 
